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"A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you're talking about
real money."'
INTRODUCTION

A revolution, spun from the minds of Wall Street "rocket scien-

tists"2 and driven by powerful new computers,' is occurring in the

global financial markets. This accelerating juggernaut is the OTC
derivatives markets, 4 a financial phenomenon that has radically
altered the landscape of the global capital markets.' As one commentator has noted:
[The OTC derivatives markets have] turned the world's capital
markets into a global Olympic Games. Every day, barriers are
broken and records set .... Never before have transactions

1. Lawrence B. Lindsey, Why the 1980s Were Not the 1920s, FORBES, Oct. 19, 1992, at 78, 78
(quoting late Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen's famous remark about government spending).
2. See Henry T.C. Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives: The Causes of lnformationalFailureand the
Promise of Regulatmy Incrementalism, 102 YALE LJ. 1457, 1459 (1993) [hereinafter Hu,
MisunderstoodDerivatives](discussing innovative financial products created by Wall Street "rocket
scientists"); Ida Picker, The Daffier Side of Derivatives, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1993, at 94,
94 (articulating rapid innovation of "[r]estless rocket scientists"). Financial innovation is being
produced almost exclusively by mathematical Ph.D.'s or individuals with science and quantitative
backgrounds. See Saul Hansell, Inside Morgan Stanley's Black Box, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May
1989, at 204, 205 (stating that former head of derivatives trading unit at Morgan Stanley was
astrophysicist); Joanna Pitman, Swooping on Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 68, 80 (noting
derivatives teams include "physicists, mathematics Ph.d's, [and] technicians").
3. See Martin French, The Comeback of the Number-Crunchers,EUROMONEY, Oct. 1988, at 69,
71 (describing how increase in computer capabilities have fueled financial quantitative analysis);
William Glasgall & BillJavetski, SwapFever BigMoney, BigRisks, Bus. WK,June 1, 1992, at 102,
102 (mentioning Sun Microsystems' workstations as integral to complex world of financial
engineering);John W. Verity, Street Smarts: The SupercomputerBecomes a Stock Strategis Bus. WK.,
June 1, 1987, at 84, 84 (relating that "supercomputers are in on Wall Street").
4. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 28 (1993)
(noting that derivatives have not only increased range of financial products available but have
also created more precise ways of understanding, quantifying, and managing financial risk). For
a discussion of the factors that have contributed to the mushrooming growth of new financial
products, see STUDY GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, RECENT INNOVATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
169-87 (1986) (noting that forces of supply and demand have promoted creation of new
financial products); Stephen A. Ross, Institutional Markets, FinancialMarketing, and Financial
Innovation, 44J. FIN. 541,542 (1989) (attributing growth in financial innovation in part to fact
that institutional investors now dominate markets); Susan Lee, What's with the Casino Society?,
FORBES, Sept. 22, 1986, at 150 (stating that newly created financial instruments are "mostly
healthy evolutionary response to a vastly changed economic world").
5. For a discussion of the impact of derivatives on the financial capital markets, see
Randall W. Forsyth, The $150 Billion Baby: Interest Rate Swaps Are Growing by Leaps and Bounds,
BARRON'S, Aug. 19, 1985, at 15, 15 (calling swaps "arguably the capital markets' most important
development of the decade"). It is interesting that swaps were lauded as the "most important
development" of the 1980s when the size of the interest rate swaps market was only $150 billion
at the close of the decade. The swaps market alone totals roughly $3.8 trillion today, and it
continues to grow exponentially. See Andrew Barry, BARRON'S, Sept. 13, 1993, at 49, 49
(reporting $3.8 trillion size of 1992 OTC swaps market, as compiled by industry association,
International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc.).
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depended on such a fine combination of mental gymnastics, client
relations and aggressive marketing... [these products] are the
greatest challenge yet to the agile banking6mind, and like the study

of the universe itself, there is no horizon.
This Comment begins with a discussion of the mechanics of OTC
derivatives that is designed to demystify the byzantine reputation of
these financial products. Part I continues with a straightforward
explanation of derivatives, including a description of the prototypical
"plain vanilla" interest-rate swap and the nature and motivation of
participants in various derivatives transactions. Part II explores how
the panoply of risks presented by the derivatives markets could lead
to systemic breakdown in the global capital markets. Part III
examines the treatment, both past and present, of OTC derivatives
transactions under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, and the
Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
In particular, this section scrutinizes the legal enforceability of
termination and netting provisions under the U.S. bankruptcy regime.
Part IV suggests three methods for reducing systemic risk that will
diffuse the legislative urge to impose procrustean regulation to
manage systemic risk.
I.

THE MECHANICS OF DERIVATIVES

Broadly defined, a derivative product is a financial contract that
"derives" its value in whole or in part from the performance of an
underlying asset, including securities, currencies, rates, or indices of
asset values. 7 Derivatives are categorized according to the nature of8
the underlying assets or indices from which they derive their value.
Most derivative instruments are classified as foreign exchange
contracts, interest rate contracts, commodity contracts, or equity
contracts. 9 Constantly evolving in response to innovation and
customer needs, there are few large asset classes for which a deriva-

6.
7.

David Shirreff, The Way into any Market, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1983, at 60, 60.
See Net Capital Rule, 58 Fed. Reg, 27,486 (1993) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R Part 240);

GARY L. GAsTINEAU, DICTIONARY OF FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 87 (1992) (defining derivative

products); Barbara D. Granito & Craig Torres, Many Americans Run Hidden FinancialRisk from
Derivatives,' WALL ST. J., Aug, 10, 1993 at Al (claiming that derivatives resemble ordinary
investments but are actually financial arrangements rather than securities); Shirreff, supra note
6, at 60 (stating that derivatives transaction is bilateral contract or payments exchange agreement
that "derives" value from underlying asset).
8.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., DERIVATIVE PRODUCT ACTIvrrIEs OF COMMERcIAL BANKS, in

JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR REGLE ON DERIVATIVE
PRODUCTS 2 (1993) [hereinafter FDICJOINT STUDY].
9. Id.
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tives market does not exist."° Well-known derivative products include
futures, swaps, options, and forwards, or some combination of these
contracts." The term "derivative" may also be used to refer to
esoteric instruments, such as embedded options,' 2 reverse floating
rate notes (inverse floaters)," and indexed currency option notes
(ICONS).' 4 It also may be used to refer to innovative exotica with
7
6
names like "mambo combo,"' 5 "strangle," "surf and turf,"
I
"swaption,"' and "death-backed bonds." 19
While many derivatives are truly complex instruments, they are not
as conceptually inscrutable as they appear to the uninitiated. Indeed,
farmers and merchants have managed to use and understand
derivatives for several thousand years.20 All derivative transactions

10. SeeRosemary Bennett, Rocket ScientistsProduceaFresh Wave ofSolutions,EUROMONEY, Mar.,
1993, at 46, 46 ("There are few large asset classes left with no accompanying derivatives
market.").
11. See generally Eli M. Remolona, The Recent Growth of FinancialDerivativeMarkets, 28 FED.
RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 28, 28-29 (1993) (discussing different types of derivative contracts).
12. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 97-98 (defining "embedded option" as option that is
inseparable part of another instrument). Common examples of embedded options are "call
provisions" in corporate bonds, which allow the issuer of the bonds to prepay the borrower
before the nominal maturity of the bond, and a homeowner's option to prepay mortgage
principal prior to mortgage maturity, resulting in early liquidation of a mortgage-backed security.
Id. at 98.
13. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 198-99 (defining "reverse floating rate note" as note
structure in which rate paid goes up as market floating rates go down). For this complex
derivative, the rate paid on the note is set by doubling the fixed swap rate in place at the time
the contract is entered into, and subtracting the floating reference index rate for each payment
period. Id. at 198; see also David Carey, Hedge Hogs, FUTURES WORLD, Mar. 16, 1993, at 51
(describing inverse floater as highly leveraged "swap piggybacking a swap," which allows bond
fund managers to place big bets on drops in short-term interest rates).
14. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 129-30 (defining "ICONs" as variation of dual currency
bond with all payments in one currency but with principal payment indexed to currency
exchange rate at maturity).
15. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 146 (defining mambo combo as unusual combination
of put and call that are both long or both short).
16. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 222 (describing strangle as combination of short put and
short call or long put and long call on same underlying security).
17. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 222 (defining surf and turf as strangle with both options
out of money).
18. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 228 (describing swaption as option to enter into swap
agreement).
19. See Albert R. Karr, Bank RegulatorSignals Move on Derivatives,WALL ST.J., Apr. 21, 1994,
at A3 (reporting that Comptroller of Currency Eugene A. Ludwig noted sardonically that "with
such names as 'harmful warrants,' 'worthless warrants,' 'death-backed bonds,' 'limbos,' and
'heaven and hell bonds' [these products are] obviously designed to inspire confidence").
20.

See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS

REGULATION 3 (1987) (discussing historical origins of futures market). In 2000 B.C., merchants
in Bahrain engaged in futures transactions for goods bound for barter in India. Id. In the 17th
century, feudal landowners traded rice futures known as "tickets" on their production. Id. at
3-4. In the 18th century, merchants bought and sold "to arrive" contracts obligating purchase
of goods that were in transit. Id. In the 19th century, "to arrive" contracts were an important
method for locking in the future price of grain in the United States, and were widely traded for
both speculation and the actual purchase and sale of grain. Id. at 3.
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can be traced to "fundamental types of building blocks" 2' known as
forwards and options.2 An "option" is a contract that creates the
right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a security at a set price for
a limited period of time.23 A "forward" is a contract that commits a
party to purchase or sell a given asset at a pre-set time for a specified
amount.2 4 By innovatively manipulating these building blocks, tailormade exposure to a broad spectrum of risk can be created. Thus,
while Wall Street "quants" 2' appear to be creating in the stratosphere, they are using earth-bound tools.
A.

Plain Vanilla Swap

The paradigm of an OTC derivative transaction is the "plain
vanilla interest rate swap. In a plain vanilla swap, a debtor with

21. SeeClifford W. Smith,Jr. & Charles W. Smithson, FinancialEngineering:An Overview, in
NEW FINANCIAL PRODUCT INNOVATIONS,
THE HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING:
APPLICATIONS, AND ANALYSES 4-9 (1990) (describing forwards as "price fixing building blocks"
and options as "price insurance building blocks").
22. See RICHARD M. BOOKSTABER, OPTION PRICING AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES viii (3d ed.
1991) (stating that "[o]ptions can be created, and once created, they can be combined to give
a limitless variety of financial payoffs"); GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 29
(explaining that abstract derivative transactions rest on relatively simple economic theories of
forwards and options). Contracts rooted in forwards include forwards and swap contracts, in
addition to exchange-traded futures. Id. at 29. Contracts rooted in options include both
exchange-traded options on futures and private, over-the-counter transactions between
counterparties such as caps, floors, collars, and options on forward and swap contracts. Id. at
30.
23.

LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT:

A COMPREHENSIVE

ANALYSIS OF LISTED OPTIONS STRATEGIES 4 (2d ed. 1986).
24. Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines 'forward contract," in pertinent part, as:
[A] contract ...for the purchase, sale, or transfer of a commodity... or any similar
good, article, service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the
subject of dealing in the forward contract trade, or product or byproduct thereof, with
a maturity date more than two days after the date the contract is entered into,
including, but not limited to, a repurchase transaction, reverse repurchase transaction,
consignment lease, swap, hedge transaction, deposit, loan, option, allocated
transaction, unallocated transaction, or any combination thereof or option thereon.
11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also Steven Lipin, Banks Ty to Avoid Rules on
Derivatives,WALL ST. J., July 22, 1993, at C1 (giving simple definition of "forward").
25. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modem Process of FinancialInnovation and the Vulnerability
ofa Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 338 (1989) [hereinafter Hu, Swaps] (noting that
financial institutions are increasingly becoming domain of quantitative theorists and calling
Ph.D.'s with quantitative backgrounds who are creative force behind financial innovation
"quants," "lightbulb heads," "rocket scientists," and "rocketo kagakushas").
26. See id. at 347 & n.40 (analogizing plain vanilla interest rate swap to "bet" and noting that
"plain vanilla" refers to any simple or common swap).
27. See G30-Managing Risk Management IFR SWAPS, July 21, 1993, at 2, 2 (stating that
financial engineering is generally agreed to have commenced with swaps); Glasgall &Javetski,
supra note 3,at 103 (calling plain vanilla interest rate swap longstanding "backbone" of OTC
derivatives industry). Swaps themselves are based on the fundamental building block of
forwards. See Granito & Torres, supra note 7, at A6 (characterizing swap as "forward-type
contract"). While swaps may be the "backbone" of the OTC derivatives market, simple futures
and options are much more ancient. See MARKHAM, supra note 20, at 3 (dating earliest use of
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fixed-rate liabilities agrees to "swap" interest payments with a debtor
who has floating-rate liabilities. 2' To illustrate, assume a small
corporation has fixed-rate assets' and a low interest, floating-rate
loan. A large corporation, with far greater resources, has a fixed-rate
loan at a higher rate of interest and floating-rate assets.8 0 If interest
rates were to rise to a rate significantly higher than the small
corporation's fixed-rate assets, the small corporation could be
financially compromised, or worse, driven into bankruptcy. Thus, the
small corporation seeks the security from market fluctuation afforded
by a fixed-rate loan, despite its higher interest rate. The large
corporation can easily absorb the market risk of a sudden rise in
interest rates and wants to take advantage of the positive spread
between the low floating rates and its fixed-rate assets. Because each
corporation's desire complements the other's need, the large and
small corporations are said to "swap" interest payments.3
B.

Hedging

As the aforementioned example illustrates, OTC derivatives are
primarily used as vehicles for hedging3 2 against unfavorable move-

futures to 2000 B.C.); J. Carter Beese, Jr., OTC Derivatives: Encouraging Innovation and
Managing Risk, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Conference on Financial
Markets 1 (Mar. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Beese, OTC Derivatives] (on file with The American
University Law Review) (describing Dutch author's account of futures and options trading on
Amsterdam Stock Exchange as early as 1688).
28. SeeRichardJ. Rendleman,Jr., How Risks Are Shared in Interest Rate Swaps,J. FIN. SERVICES
RES. 6, 6-7 (1992) (explaining mechanics of plain vanilla swap).
29. See Scot Tucker, Comment, InterestRate Swaps and the 1990 Amendments to the United States
Bankruptcy Code: A Measure of Certainty Within Swap Market Contracts,1991 UTAH L.REv. 581, 586
(suggesting long-term mortgages secured by fixed-rate notes as example of fixed-rate assets).
Alternatively, fixed-rate assets can be described as investments that return a known, fixed-rate
of return. Id. For example, a bank that loans money at a fixed-rate of 6% has a fixed-rate asset
of 6% ofwhatever amount it lends. If the bank itself borrows that same money prior to lending
at a floating-rate of 4%, the bank incurs a floating-rate liability to offset its fixed-rate asset.
30. See Tucker, supra note 29,at 586 (offering commercial loan as example of floating-rate
asset).

31. See Michael P. Jamroz, The Net CapitalRule, 47 Bus. LAW. 863, 900 (1992) (explaining
that interest rate swaps are tailored to meet specific client needs). Although the lenders are still
obligated under their original lending arrangements to repay principal, the interest rate swap
obligates the counterparties to make interest payments based on their counterparties' interest
arrangements. Id. at 900-01.
32. See FDICJoINT STUDY, supra note 8, at 3 (describing "hedging" as acquiring position in
instrument that moves opposite direction in value from existing or anticipated position with
.goal of protecting that existing or anticipated position against loss due to fluctuations in prices,
interest rates or exchange rates"); GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 123 (defining "hedge" as action
that reduces risk, often at expense of opportunity for profit);J. Carter Beese,Jr., The CEO's Guide
to Derivatives, CHIEF EXEcuTIVE, Mar. 1994, at 32 (stating that derivatives are primarily used as
hedging instruments). An example of a hedge is the purchase of a derivative that increases in
value when a stock goes down, known as a "short." See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 210 (defining
"short" as "investment position which will benefit from a decline in price"). This "short" can be
purchased to offset the downside risk of a position that increases in value as the stock price
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ments in the capital markets. The customized nature3 of derivatives
allows end-users to hedge risk in a manner more closely resembling
the actual risk that they are assuming than was ever possible with
ordinary securities.3 4 A derivative instrument that rises in value when
cattle prices go up can protect McDonald's 5 hamburger profits, just
as one that rises in value when cattle prices go down affords protection to a cattle rancher.
The derivatives markets provide participants with an opportunity to
"disaggregate risk, bear those risks they can manage, and transfer
those they are unwilling to bear."3 6 This risk-shifting function
affords protection to multinational corporations from "interest rate,
Thus, end-users of
raw material and currency fluctuations."37
derivatives are free to focus on the pursuit of their business goals,
having successfully hedged risks that are peripheral to their primary
business.3 8
C. Size
Fueled by the need to hedge risks, the rapid pace of derivative
39
innovation and explosion in market size has been stunning.
Indeed, the quick growth in this field has been referred to as "one of

increases, known as a "long" position. See id. at 142 (defining "long" as investment position
which benefits from market rises). If the stock goes down, the investor makes money on the
short position, but loses an equivalent sum on the long position. If it goes up, the reverse
occurs. Using offsetting transactions, the investor can eliminate or diminish one or more types
of risk. See id. at 123 (providing example of basic hedging technique).
33. See Derivatives Q. and A.: Gary Gray &J. Nicholas Rosman, BOND BUYER, Oct. 6, 1993,
at 7, 7 (discussing movement toward still greater degree of tailor-made products designed to
meet specific hedging needs of investors).
34. SeeJ. Carter Beese,Jr., Derivatives: Fundamentally Changing Corporate Finance, Asset
Management... and the Retail Industry?, Remarks at 1993 Annual Meeting/Southern District
Securities Industry Association 1 (May 8, 1993) [hereinafter Beese, Derivatives] (on file with The
American University Law Review) (stating that derivatives allow participants to "modify their risks
and potential returns in nearly any way that suits them").
35. Indeed, McDonald's Corporation is a significant user of derivatives. See Barry B. Burr,
Mark Derivatives to Market Daily, Study Says, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Aug. 9, 1993, at 3, 3
(discussing McDonald's embrace of derivatives). As ofJune 30, 1993, McDonald's had in place
"45 interest rate swaps in 8 currencies and 51 currency swaps in 12 currencies," in addition to
substantial use of a variety of other OTC derivatives. Id.
36. J. Carter Beese, Jr., Risk Management in an International Context: Lessons from the
Past, Remarks at SOFFEX-Five Years in the Financial Arena 3 (June 4, 1993) [hereinafter
Beese, Risk Management] (on file with The American University Law Review).
37. Beese, Risk Management, supranote 36, at 3.
38. Beese, Risk Management, supranote 36, at 3.
39. See Wendy L. Gramm, In Defense of Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at A12
(asserting that rapidity of derivatives' growth and acceptance provides evidence of global utility);
Robert Lenzner & William Heuslein, The Age ofDigital Capitalism,FORBES, Mar. 29, 1993, at 62,
63 (noting that until quite recently derivatives were "obscure backwater of the securities
business").
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the most dramatic success stories in modem economic history."' ° At
the end of 1991, the "notional outstanding amount"4 1 of all global
derivatives, on both organized exchanges42 and OTC markets, was
measured at $10 trillion. 3 At that time, OTC derivatives alone
accounted for $6 trillion in notional principal." With $3.8 trillion
of this figure in swaps,45 the notional value of the swaps market has
surpassed the aggregate value of all stocks traded on the New York
and Tokyo stock exchanges combined.46 Totalling only $3 billion in
notional principal in 1982,"7 the market for swaps, the most common

40. David W. Mullins, Jr., Remarks on the Global DerivativesStudy Sponsored by the Group of
Thirty, ISDA SUMMER CONFERENCE 1 (1993) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(noting that in mere span of 25 years derivatives have gone from genesis to permeation of entire
global financial system); see also BarnabyJ. Feder, Chicago'sExchanges Look Toward an Electronic
Salvation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, at F5 (calling derivatives "a basic cog in the global economy
and one of the most incredible growth industries ever").
41. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 159 (defining "notional principal amount" as nominal
face value of transaction that is not itself amount of one party's obligation to counterparty).
42. Examples of exchanges that trade derivatives include the American Stock Exchange, the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, the London International Financial Futures Exchange,
and the Tokyo Financial Futures Exchange. FDICJOINT STUDY, supra note 8, at 4 n.1.
43. See Remolona, supranote 11, at 28-29 (using Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), and Federal Reserve Bank of New
York staff estimates as sources). The extraordinary growth of both OTC and exchange-traded
derivatives has been greatest in contracts based on interest rates. See id. at 30.
While the use of derivative products has soared, the value of derivatives transactions handled
on the OTC market has clearly outgrown the value of derivatives transactions occurring on the
exchange markets. In 1986, the OTC and exchange-traded markets enjoyed similar notional
size: $583 billion for exchange-traded instruments and $500 billion for OTC products. Peter
Lee, American Exchanges Plan to Fight Back, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1993, at 46, 46. Today, the OTC
markets control three-fifths of the notional value of derivatives. Remolona, supra note 11, at 29.
Quite recently, exchanges have sought to wrest business from the OTC markets through the
creation of innovative, customized products. In February 1993, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) began offering Flexible Exchange Options (Flex options). See Hal Lux,
Exchanges Use Flex to Muscle in on OTC, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DiG., Aug. 9, 1993, at 16, 16-17
(describing competitive steps exchanges have taken to vie for OTC-dominated customized
business). In less than six months, Flex options traded over $6 billion in notional principle.
Id.
The success of CBOE's Flex options did not go unnoticed by their archrivals at the American
Stock Exchange (Amex), which launched Flex options on four stock indices, including the first
international Flex product on the Japanese index. Id. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange is also
developing currency options with Flex features. Id.
44. Remolona, supra note 11, at 28-29.
45. See Barry, supra note 5, at 49 (citing recently released ISDA study describing total size
of swaps market in 1992 as $3.8 trillion). The data from ISDA showed a 25% increase in the
size of the swaps market from 1991 to 1992. Id.
46. See Glasgall &Javetski, supra note 3, at 102 (contrasting $5 trillion notional size of swaps
market to underlying markets); cf. GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 58 (quoting size
of swaps market at $4.5 trillion for same period); Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supra note 2, at
1459 (stating that notional size of swaps market for same period was $4 trillion).
47. William P. Rogers, Jr., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related Transactions,in THE
SWAP MARKET IN 1990 7, 13 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 689, 1990).
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form of derivative, has risen over 1200-fold in ten years.4 8 One
recent estimate for the total notional size of all derivatives markets is
$16 trillion, with $10 trillion in OTC derivatives alone. 9
Notional principal

1.

While anecdotally interesting, notional principal affords little utility
in determining the true size of the market.5 ° In the majority of
derivatives transactions, notional principal is nothing more than the
benchmark against which accrual of interest payments is measured.5
Because the notional principal amount rarely changes hands, notional
principal does not accurately indicate the amount of money at risk.52
David W. Mullins, formerly both a Harvard University professor 53 and
Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, has stated: "[W]hile the notional value of swaps hovers
around $7 trillion, only a fraction - $170 billion - is actually at risk."54

48. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 586 (describing tremendous growth of interest rate swaps
market between 1982 and 1988). The growth multiple has been updated here using the more
recent notional principal figure of $3.8 trillion. See supra note 45 and accompanying text
(pegging notional size of 1992 swaps market at $3.8 trillion).
49. See CarolJ. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 43 ("So
notional values go into the adding machine and out comes trillions.").
50.

See COMMODrIY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR

REGULATION 2 (1993) [hereinafter CFTC REPORT] (debunking notion that notional principal
accurately reflects market size because it does not reflect amount at risk). Because the notional
principal rarely changes hands, criticism has arisen over its utility as an indicator of amount at
risk, leading to overblown fears of systemic risk. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at
58 (noting that measuring market by notional principal amount greatly exaggerates actual risk);
Floyd Norris, Swapping Woes: A Fed Official Sees Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1992, at Al (finding
that while notional figures are enormous, they "grossly overstate the size and risk of the
market"); Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at the International Swap Dealers Association Annual
Meeting 10 (Mar. 11, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review) ("[T]he
astronomical estimates of notional principal amount can be used as red herrings.... [C]redit
risk as measured by replacement cost value is acknowledged to constitute a small fraction of
notional value."). Despite these criticisms, notional outstanding amounts are the primary figures
used to measure the size of derivatives markets. See Hu, Swaps, supra note 25, at 391 (explaining
notional amount's widespread use as more result of easy availability than usefulness in
determining accurate market values).
51. See Interest Swap: Hearings on S.396 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1989) [hereinafter Senate
Interest Swap Hearings] (statement of Mark C. Brickell, Chairman, ISDA) (noting that principal
amount of contract is generally not transferred).
52. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, OFF-BALANCE-SHEET AcnvTES OF GERMAN BANKS 58 (Oct.
1993) (describing criticism of notional principal by "market players" because it does not reflect
amount being risked).
53. See Saul Hansell and Kevin Muehring, Why DerivativesRattle the Regulators, INSTrrtUIONAL
INVESTOR, Sept. 1992, at 49, 53 (describing studies Mullins conducted while teaching at Harvard
University).
54. See Claudia Cummins, Regulators Seen Pulling Together, AM. BANKER, Apr. 5, 1993, at 2
(quoting David W. Mullins). SEC Commissioner Beese places the amount more conservatively
between two and five percent. See Beese, Derivatives, supra note 34, at 32 (discussing credit risk
as percentage of notional amount); see also Marc Levinson, Sony, No CrisisHere, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
25 1994, at 40, 42 ("Merrill Lynch held derivatives with a face value of $891 billion at the end
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Further, notional amounts reflect double counting of derivatives
transactions.55 For example, if J.P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan
Bank engage in a swap with $5 billion in notional amount, this will be
counted as a $5 billion transaction for each firm. Thus, this $5 billion
transaction will anecdotally be listed as $10 billion in notional
principle. Careless use of such elephantine figures" may lead to
overblown fears of the systemic risks57 presented by derivatives.5"
2.

Volatility

The volatile economic climate of the last thirty years has added to
the strong appetite for derivatives' hedging properties. The European
currency crisis of September 1992"9 exemplifies the extreme volatility
of currencies in an increasingly global marketplace. Similarly, the
wild interest rate swings of the 1970s and 1980s indicate greater levels
of volatility than that which occurred immediately prior to the market
disruption of 1929.' Commodity price volatility in the past twenty
years has far surpassed that of the preceding twenty-year period. 6'
The stock market disruptions of 1987 and 1989 have focused
institutional attention on the need to effectively hedge equity
portfolios against extreme volatility and liquidity crises.62 Together,
these factors have created great anxiety among participants in the
capital markets, setting the stage for the derivatives revolution.

of 1993, but it would have lost less than $7 billion had every one of its trading partners gone out
of business.").
55. See Beese, Derivatives, supra note 34, at 32.
56. See Loomis, supra note 49, at 43 (noting that notional sizes dwarf United States' $6.4
trillion gross domestic product).
57. See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (describing systemic risk).
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing vast size of notional outstanding
amount).
59. See H. Onno Ruding, After the Currency Crisis, Can EuropeRevive a Monetary Policy?,INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 3, 1993, at Cl (discussing extreme volatility in currencies that accompanied
European currency crisis).
60. See Sean Becketti & Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., Has FinancialMarket Volatility Increased?,in
RESEARCH DIVISION, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CrITY, FINANCIAL MARKET VOLATILITYAND

THE ECONOMY 9 (1990) (comparing current interest rate volatility with volatility immediately
prior to 1929).
61. Robert J. Shiller, Causer of ChangingFinancialMarket Volatility, in FINANCIAL MARKET
VoLATIITry, supra note 57, at 3-4 (1988) (noting that growth of commodity-market volatility in
1970s and 1980s was far beyond that of 1950s and 1960s).
62. SeeFord S. Worthy, What We Learnedfrom the '87Crash, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 98, 98
(describing institutional investors' desire to hedge equity risks with derivatives in aftermath of
stock market crash).
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OTC DerivativesEnd-Users

Today's players in the OTC derivatives market consist primarily of
corporations, governmental entities, financial institutions, and
institutional investors.63 Although it is rare, extremely wealthy
individuals occasionally are directly involved as counterparties to these
Because the average amount of
privately negotiated contracts.'
notional principal involved in a single swap transaction totals $24
million, however, the vast majority of derivatives participants are
institutional entities.65
Because of the growing involvement of mutual funds, insurance
companies, pension funds, and governmental entities in derivatives,
the investment mainstream has become, indirectly, a collective enduser.66 For example, the state of Texas recently became an OTC
derivatives player when it hedged against a possible loss in tax revenue
caused by a drop in oil prices.67 There is a growing movement by
other states to enter the derivatives market to hedge against losses by
industries integral to their respective local economies. 68

63. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 34 (noting that one of two main groups
participating in derivatives market are institutional investors) ;Joanne T. Medero, The Challenges
of Change, Remarks at the IBC Financial Focus OTC Derivatives Conference 1-2 (Apr. 20, 1993)
(on file with The American University Law Review) (noting institutional nature of derivatives endusers).

64. See, e.g., Salomon Forex Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768, 769 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting
wealthy individual with net worth in excess of $500 million was counterparty in OTC currency
options transaction), affd, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993).
65. See Senate Interest Swap Hearings, supra note 51, at 22 (statement of Mark C. Brickell,
Chairman, ISDA). A separate barrier to entry is the need for sophisticated risk management
systems, which most retail investors cannot afford. SeeAnn Monroe & Susan Arterian, Balanced
on the Edge, PLAN SPONSOR, Feb. 1994, at 30, 35-36 (quoting Kenneth Weiss, derivatives risk
manager: "It's absolutely unquestionable that you can't manage derivatives, you can't own
derivatives - you shouldn't own derivatives - if you can't analyze them."). One sophisticated risk
management software package leases for roughly $2,500 a month. Id. at 33.
66. See Granito & Torres, supranote 7, at Al (noting that many Americans are indirectly
involved in derivatives). Even the 12 million investors in fixed-income mutual funds, generally
thought to be an extremely conservative investment, are heavily enmeshed, indirectly, in the
OTC derivatives world. Id. An "end user" is a party that utilizes a derivative product. GROUP
OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 34. The use of derivatives to enhance returns by county
treasurers has become a political issue. See Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Derivatives Foil California
Political Race, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1994, at Cl (reporting that Orange County, California
treasurer had to give brokers additional $140 million of collateral after interest rate movements
caused paper losses in county's portfolio, prompting treasurer's opponent in upcoming election
to say that "leveraging public money makes me nervous").
67. See Anita Raghavan, States Hitting Options Pits to Hedge Risk, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1992,
at C1 (describing Texas' foray into commodity options to hedge oil price volatility).
68. See id. (noting that Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York have also used derivatives
to offset the risks of energy price fluctuations).
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Municipalities as far flung as Salt River, Arizona 9 and school
districts as small as Osseo, Minnesota have issued bonds with
derivatives attached." But do the treasurers of these small towns
and school districts have the financial acumen to match wits with the
panoply of risks derivatives present?7 Because of the general public's
indirect exposure to derivatives through municipal bond offerings,
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt has recently questioned the suitability of
derivatives for "individual investors, state and local governments, and
pension funds.""2
Currently, there is no requirement that an OTC derivative
instrument be "suitable" for the needs of a particular end-user. In
contrast, dealers of exchange-traded products are proscribed from
recommending options transactions unless they have a reasonable
basis for believing the customer has the knowledge and sophistication
73
to evaluate and financially bear the transaction in question.
Regulatory movement in the direction of a "suitability" standard for
OTC derivatives has commenced.74 Advocacy of an "appropriateness" standard for selling an OTC derivative to a particular customer,

69. See Jill Andresky Fraser, Why Derivatives Aren't Just for City Slickers, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Feb. 1994, at95, 95 (listing diverse group of municipalities that have added derivatives
to bond offerings).
70. See id. at 95 (describing how small school district used inverse floaters in $47 million
bond offering).
71. See infra Section III. (describing wide variety of risks present in use of derivatives).
Indeed, larger and more sophisticated trading and corporate operations have already been
burned by derivatives. See supra notes 108-33 and accompanying text (listing losses at large
institutions); Steven Lipin et al.,Just What FirmsDowith "Derivatives'is Suddenly a Hot Issue, WALL
ST.J., Apr. 14, 1994, at Al, A7 (detailing how corporate treasurer at Proctor & Gamble did not
understand derivatives risks).
72. Chairman Levitt remarked:
At the SEC, we are particularly concerned about derivatives and their suitability for
individual investors, state and local governments, and pension funds. We take this
issue very seriously. And we will do our best to make sure brokers take it seriously, too.
We are currently considering sending a strong signal to this end.
Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Public Securities Association Annual Meeting 5 (Mar. 4, 1994)
[hereinafter Levitt, PSA Speech] (on file with The American University Law Review); see SEC To
PushforMore MunicipalSecurityDisclosure, Reuters, Mar. 4,1994, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File (noting Chairman Levitt's call for better disclosure to market); SEC Member Issues
Warning About Sales of Some Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1994, at B5 (articulating SEC
Commissioner Richard Roberts' view that suitability rule for municipal derivatives is possible).
In the meantime, Commissioner Roberts cautioned securities firms that sell municipal derivatives
to "take all reasonable steps necessary to ensure suitability." Id.
73. See Brandon Becker & Jeffrey P. Bums, Regulating the Options Marke INSTrrTONAL
INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at 29, 29-30 (describing the "suitability" requirements for exchange traded
options developed by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-regulatory
organizations (SRO's)). SRO's are composed of the exchanges and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Id. at 29. Factors considered for such suitability include information
regarding a customer's net worth, annual income, and investment sophistication. Id.
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing Chairman Levitt's and
Commissioner Roberts' urging of voluntary suitability standards).
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a standard significantly easier to meet than "suitability,"7 5 has been
presented both by Iowa Congressman James Leach and by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).77 In Recommen-

dation 22, Congressman Leach suggests that "bank dealer[s] should
be required to evaluate whether a particular transaction is appropriate
for a particular customer."'
This view echoes that of the OCC,
which states that national banks should "understand the applicability
of financial derivatives instruments to the risks that [their] bank
customer is attempting to hedge."79 While the OCC rules are
binding on national banks,"0 and Congressman Leach's proposal is
a mere recommendation, the Congressman has persuasively urged
compliance by suggesting that regulators should also consider
enacting more stringent "suitability" rules.8"
E.

OTC DerivativesDealers

Intermediaries, referred to as "dealers," satisfy end-user needs by
developing and "making a market"e 2 in OTC derivatives.83 In the
process, these dealers expect to derive financial gain from transaction
fees, bid-offer spreads, 4 and profits from proprietary trading.

75. SeeDerivatives Q. and A.: DouglasE.Harris,BOND BUYER, Nov. 24, 1993, at 7 (explaining
that examination of whether transaction is "appropriate" for particular customer "certainly
doesn't go as far as being a suitability rule").
76. See Recommendations of Rep. fim Leach Released Nov. 22 on Oversight ofDerivativesMarkets,
61 BANKING REP. (BNA) 865 (1993) [hereinafter Leach Recommendations (discussing "suitability"
and "appropriateness" of derivatives for certain end-users in Recommendation 22).
Congressman Leach is the senior Republican on the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs.
77. See Banking Circular 277, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 12 (1993)
[hereinafter OCC Banking Circular 277] (advocating that banks understand "applicability" of
derivative instruments to risk bank is attempting to manage).
78. See LeachRecommendations, supranote 76, at 865 ("Proper due diligence in evaluating the
appropriateness of a derivative product for a prospective customer is the best safe-guard for both
the dealer and the end-user.").
79. OCC Banking Circular 277, supranote 77, at 12.
80. See OCC Banking Circular 277, supra note 77, at 1 (articulating that national banks are
"expected to follow" the guidelines laid down by the OCC).
81. See Leach Recommendations, supra note 76, at 865 ("The regulators should also consider
whether industry-wide suitability rules should be enacted and cross-industry guidelines
enacted.").
82. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 148 (defining "market maker" as dealer who regularly
quotes both bids and offers and is ready to provide two-sided market).
83. FDIC JOINT STUDY, supra note 8, at 6 (describing dealers' role as market makers to
satisfy certain clients).
84. A "bid-offer spread" is the difference between the bid and the offer price of a financial
instrument. GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 37. This spread is widely used as a measure of market
liquidity. Id. When the spread is large, there is room for the dealer to profit by pricing the
instrument less favorably to one of the end-users. The transaction is simply arranged so that the
seller receives an amount slightly less than the amount paid by the buyer. For example, if the
buyer pays 10% in a swap transaction, and the seller receives 9.95%, the bid-offer spread on the
deal amounts to 0.05%. The 0.05% spread between the bid and the offer thus becomes the
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Several large financial institutions, particularly banks, are both dealers
of OTC derivatives and end-users.8 As end-users, these banks have
reaped record profits from proprietary trading. In the second quarter
of 1993, for example, the top seven banks in the United States
reported $2.25 billion dollars in trading profits, 6 which was largely
the result of profitable trading in the OTC derivatives markets.8 7
Interestingly, stock prices for many of these banks actually declined
after record earnings were announced. 8 One explanation for this
phenomenon is the "off-balance sheet"8 9 nature of derivative
transactions.'
Because these transactions need not be explicitly
disclosed by banks, many investors and industry experts fear banks
may be using derivatives as a less capital-intensive means of generating
revenue, despite the potential for unprecedented losses.9 1 A
collateral fear of overreliance on trading profits, which are considered
a more volatile source of income than traditional banking activities,
explains the investing public's apparent disdain for record earn92
ings.

dealer's profit on the transaction. FDICJOINT STUDY, supranote 8, at 6-7.
85. See Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 39, at 71 (referring to dealer that also end-uses as
'bank (that] eats its own cooking").
86. Steven Lipin, Banks Rely More on Trading,but Say LittleAboutlt, WALL ST.J.,July 30, 1993,
at B3.
87. See Donald H. Layton, Senior Management Principles: The Derivatives Dealer Bank,
Presentation at the International Swaps & Derivatives Association Review of the Group of Thirty
Global Derivatives Study (July 28, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review) (noting
that over $5 billion of trading revenue was concentrated among merely six banks in 1992).
88. SeeG. Bruce Knecht, J.P.Morgan 4th-PeriodNet Surged, FourOther Banks Also Report Gains,
WALL ST. J.,Jan. 14, 1994, at A2 (announcing record trading revenue atJ.P. Morgan & Co.).
WhileJ.P. Morgan's trading revenue rose to $606 million from the previous year's figure of $200
million, the stock wallowed. Id.
89. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 160 (defining off-balance sheet instrument as contract
that changes entity's risk structure without appearing as asset or liability on traditional balance
sheet). Off balance sheet instruments are merely summarized as footnotes to the financial
statement. Id. See also infra notes 436-38 and accompanying text (describing Financial
Accounting Standards Board's minimal requirements for disclosure of off-balance sheet items).
90. SeeLipin, supranote 86, atB3 (quoting Merrill Lynch banking analyst as stating- "[T]he
disclosure factor is a major handicap for why banks don't get credit [in their stock price for
record trading revenues]").
91. See Lipin, supranote 86, at B3 (explaining lack of disclosure as one of reasons banks'
trading revenues are not adequately reflected in stock price). The stock market is particularly
sensitive to rumors of derivatives trading losses. See Gordon Matthews, Stocks: Bankers Trust
Plunges From 52-Week High on Talk of Trading Woes, AM. BANKER, Mar. 14, 1994, at 24, 24
(reporting that Bankers Trust stock declined 12% on rumors of trading losses). Lack of trading
information disclosure was cited for exacerbating the stock's decline. See id. (quoting Paine
Webber analyst Lawrence W. Cohn).
92. See G. Bruce Knecht, Bankers Trust's 4th-PeriodNet Doubled, Bank of Boston Up 29%, Key
Corp. 14%, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1994, at A4 ("[T]he stock market fears that the bank is
overreliant on trading activities, which are generally viewed as a volatile source of earnings");
Gabriella Stern and Susan Pulliam, Banc One's SlideEnds Acquisition Spree, Producingfitters Among
Some Investors,WALL ST.J., Feb. 17, 1994, at C1, C1-2 (describing Banc One's stock price at twoyear low despite $1.14 billion in net profit); Gabriella Stem, Banc One's Sliding Stock Price Scuttles
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In the first quarter of 1994, many of these fears proved prophetic."3 In an environment of rising interest rates, the U.S. financial
markets dropped sharply.9 4 Investors who owned derivatives that
increased in value when interest rates dropped,95 or when the stock
and bond markets rose, incurred large losses.96 Subsequent to
reporting anemic trading revenue for the quarter, however, stock
prices of three of the biggest users of derivatives did not change
97
significantly.
II. RISK
Derivatives improve economic efficiency by breaking apart risk98
and parceling it out to the parties who are the cheapest and most
willing risk-bearers.99 Although derivatives efficiently transfer risk,
they do not eliminate it.1"e Derivative end-users and dealers are

Accord to Acquire Nebraska'sFirsTier,WALL ST.J., Feb. 15, 1994, atA5 (quoting bank analyst stating
"Banc One's stock has been hurt... due to a belief that its use of derivatives is excessive.").
93. See, e.g., Steven Lipin & Gabriella Stem, Bankers Trust Gets Big Boost From Sale of
Derivatives;Another Client Has Loss, WALL ST.J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3 (noting disclosure by Bankers
Trust that it incurred losses in first quarter of 1993 of $49 million trading bond and currency
derivatives for its own account). Roughly 75% of Bankers Trust's net profit in the first quarter
of 1994 came from derivatives sales, lending credence to fears of overreliance on a volatile profit
source. Id.; see also Morgan Net Tumbles, Others Post Slight Gains, INVESToR's Bus. DAILY, Apr. 15,
1994, at A5 (reporting thatJ.P. Morgan's profits declined 20% in first quarter of 1994 because
of losses in proprietary derivatives trading).
94. SeeJay Matthews, FinanialMarkets Take Another Dip, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1994, at Al
(reporting sharp declines in stock and bond markets).
95. See Laura Jereski, MortgageDerivatives Claim Victims Big and Small, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20,
1994, at C1 (describing "bloodbath in mortgage derivatives" afflicting Kidder Peabody & Co.).
Dell Computer Corporation incurred a paper loss of between $5 million and $15 million. See
Kyle Pope, Dell Computer Sees DerivativesLosses; Stock Drops 12%, WALL ST.J., Apr. 22, 1994, at B10
(stating that Dell stock dropped 12% on news of derivatives loss).
96. See Brett D. Fromson, Derivatives Losses CutJ.P. Morgan's Profits, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,

1994, at BI (noting that J.P. Morgan lost roughly $100 million from trading during market
downturn).
97. Chemical Bank stock declined 1.3%, Bankers Trust rose 0.7%, and Citicorp declined
0.6%. See Brett D. Fromson, TradingLosses Take 3 Big Banks' Profits Below Expectations, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at Cl, C4 (reporting slight investor reaction to announcement of losses).
98. See A Comedy of Errors,ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993, at 4, 4 (defining risk as "the volatility
of potential outcomes").
99. See Mullins, supranote 40, at 3 (suggesting that derivatives reduce cost of risk-bearing
and therefore improve economic efficiency).
100. See Beese, Risk Management, supra note 36, at 3 (emphasizing that OTC derivatives
allow investors to "disaggregate risk, bear those risks they can manage, and transfer those they
are unwilling to bear"). The argument can be made, however, that aggregate risk in the system
is somewhat reduced by risk that is offset naturally between two parties. For example, assume
that party A has an unhedged short position in Japanese yen in anticipation of a decline in the
yen's value. Party B is holding an unhedged long position in yen in anticipation of an increase
in the yen's value. If A and B are paired off as counterparties to reduce their respective
exposures to unfavorable market movements, risk is reduced from the system through the
natural offset of the parties' positions. Thus, A and B each experience an equal reduction of
risk without passing new risk to any third party. This derivative transaction illustrates that not
all derivatives transactions are zero sum games. Both parties A and B can be viewed as

19941

OTC DERIVATIVES

1039

exposed, in varying degrees, to market risk"' and credit risk, 102 as
0 4 and legal risk. 0 5
well as operational,'
liquidity,"
Regulators
°
of the financial markets" have expressed fears that the derivatives
market, and perhaps the entire global financial system, may be
exposed to the systemic risk1" 7 of cascading counterparty default.
A.

Market Risk

Exposure to market risks in OTC derivatives trading can be
substantial.0"
Some financial market regulators have expressed
fears that institutional managers do not understand the exposure that
accompanies their derivatives positions."° Indeed, the sizes of the

"winning," regardless of market movement, because both have offset risk in the manner they
desire.
101. See GASrINFAU, supra note 7, at 148 (defining "market risk" as "exposure to (adverse)
price change"); Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supranote 2, at 1468 (defining market risk as "risk
that interest rates or other market factors will move adversely"). Derivatives' market risk
resembles that of the underlying cash instrument. R isfor Risk, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993, at
33, 33. Derivatives contracts are primarily designed to hedge the market risks of the underlying
cash instrument in order to "buy the share, sell the future." Id.
102. See GAsTINEAu, supra note 7, at 77 (defining "credit risk" as exposure to loss due to
default on derivative instrument); Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supra note 2, at 1457 (finding
credit risk and market risk to be most important risks associated with OTC derivatives).
103. See Mullins, supra note 40, at 4 (finding operational risk of derivatives no greater than
risks associated with traditional financial instruments).
104. See GASrINEAu, supra note 7, at 6 (explaining that although phenomenon of
securitization has improved illiquidity in financial markets, "not all packages of risks and rewards
are freely or actively traded"). For an example of how illiquid market conditions impair the
ability to engage in derivatives transactions, see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text
(explaining potential impossibility of implementing derivatives hedges during illiquid market
disruptions).
105. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 51 (characterizing "legal risk" as risk of
loss due to unenforceable contract).
106. See Peter Lee, How to Exorcise Your DerivativeDemons, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1992, at 36, 46
(listing regulatory agencies currently studying systemic risks posed by OTC derivatives); E. Gerald
Corrigan, Remarks at the 64th Annual Mid-Winter Meeting of the New York State Bankers
Association 12-14 (Jan. 30, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review) (giving dire
warnings about potential systemic implications should OTC derivatives market experience
widespread default).
107. Systemic risk is the possibility that many major financial institutions will collapse because
of the inability of one bank to fulfill its contractual obligations. See infra notes 212-23 and
accompanying text (discussing fears of financial collapse and increasing regulatory concern
about systemic risk).
108. See Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supranote 2, at 1469 (warning that losses from options
trading may be "potentially unlimited").
109. See Saul Hansell, The Risk Collectors, INSTrUTIrONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1991, at 57, 58
(claiming that some firms "don't even know how much they have at risk"); Breeden, supra note
50, at 6 (expressing concern that smaller end-users are not sophisticated enough to comprehend
market risk or proper hedging techniques); Nancy Newcomb, Remarks at ISDA's Review of the
Group of Thirty's Derivatives Study, Operational and Control Issues 12 (July 28, 1993) (on file
with The American University Law Review) (blaming $377 million loss in unhedged mortgage
backed securities trade on failure to understand or independently evaluate market risks). But
see Gramm, supra note 39, at A12 (rebutting "supposed inability of senior managers to establish
adequate internal controls"). Ms. Gramm, former Chairperson of the Commodity Futures
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most notorious losses in this market have been remarkable.
Merrill Lynch lost $377 million on one unhedged position in
mortgage-backed securities in 1987.11° Salomon Brothers lost $250
million betting on the yield curve' over a two-month period in
1992.112 Bankers Trust created $39 million in non-performing assets
in a single interest rate swap," 3 and reportedly lost an additional
$300 million following a 1994 rise in interest rates." 4 Analysts have
pegged J.P. Morgan's losses during the same period at $100 million.'
Proctor & Gamble Co. and Gibson Greeting Inc. lost $157
6
million and $16.7 million respectively on interest rate swaps."
George Soros lost $600 million of his $10 billion quantum hedge fund
on European bond and currency options."" Money manager David
Askin lost virtually all of the $600 million he was attempting to
manage using mortgage-backed derivatives,"' and Kidder Peabody
lost the $25.5 million that it lent Askin so he could leverage those
investments." 9 The same week, Kidder Peabody announced a $350
million earnings loss because their former head government bond
trader entered fictitious trades into the computer to create the
12
illusion of huge profits.

Trading Commission, asserts that price modeling, assessment of credit risk, and internal
management controls have developed concurrentlywith the sophistication of these products and
that greater market regulation is not needed. Id. at A12.
110. See Newcomb, supra note 109, at 12 (attributing magnitude of loss to fact that
investment bank did not completely understand market risks); see also MICHAEL LEWIs, LIAR'S
POKER 144-47 (1989) (relating Merrill Lynch executive's explanation of large loss by stating that
mortgage trader Howard A. Rubin 'just put [the bonds) in his drawer" without Merrill Lynch's
knowledge); MerrillLynch Reports Loss, Dismissal N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1987, § 1, at 38 (reporting
that Howard Rubin was dismissed for unauthorized trading).
111. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 249 (defining "yield curve" as bond graph that compares
interest rate yields to value of bond at maturity).
112. See Granito & Torres, supranote 7, at A6 (attributing $250 million Salomon Brothers,
Inc. trading loss to mortgage derivatives).
113. Miriam Bensman, Too Damn Smart..., GLOBAL CUSTODIAN, Sept. 1992, at 132, 135.
114. Lipin et al., supra note 71, atA7.
115. Fromson, supranote 96, at Bi.
116. Both companies have taken the unprecedented step of threatening legal action against
their OTC derivatives dealer, Bankers Trust. See Steven Lipin et al., Bankers Trust Thrives Pitching
Derivatives, But Climate Is Shifting,WALL ST.J., Apr. 22, 1994, at Al, A5 ("It is clear that [Gibson
Greetings] should never have been put in a position like this, as we relied on Bankers Trust to
advise us on these transactions.") Proctor & Gamble has vowed not to use risky derivatives
again. See id. (quoting Proctor & Gamble's chairman: "Derivatives like these are dangerous, and
we were badly burned.... We won't let this happen again.").
117. BrettD. Fromson, SpeculatorSees PossibleDangerinDerivatives,WASH. POST, Apr. 14,1994,
at DlI, D14.
118. See Brett D. Fromson, The $10 Trillion Toss, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1994, at Hl, H4
(describing Askin's loss using obscure, illiquid derivative known as "toxic waste").
119. Id. at H14 (reporting Kidder Peabody's loan loss).
120. See id. (noting larcenous trader was paid a trading-based bonus of $9 million in 1993
for his phantom "profits"). The trader, JosephJett, accomplished his fraud using government
bond "strips." Id. Strips are created by splitting the interest and principal portion of a
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Losses of this magnitude cannot simply be attributed to a speculative American approach to proprietary trading. In 1993, Showa Shell
Sekiyu KR, a Japanese oil company, lost $1.59 billion trading
currency derivatives."' Kashima Oil, a Japanese oil refiner, has
unrealized losses equivalent to almost $1.5 billion in forward foreign
exchange contracts. 22 Toyota, Japan's largest car manufacturer,
incurred losses of $935 million in six months while attempting to
hedge its foreign exchange risk. 2 British multinational AlliedLyons encountered a £147 million loss betting against the dollar in
1991.124 Klockner & Company KGaA, a German trading company,
lost $380 million on crude oil forward contracts, destroying over fifty
percent of its capital."z
Perhaps the most notorious loss in this market is that of
Metallgesellschaft AG, the German engineering and metals conglomerate. 2 ' This allegedly "sophisticated trading outfit" 2 7 lost nearly
$1.4 billion attempting to hedge with oil futures.2 As the result of
government bond into two discrete components. Id. Jett pretended to engage in derivatives
contracts where he rejoined these strips and manipulated Kidder Peabody's computer system
to continue to elude detection. Id.
121. See Granito & Torres, supra note 7, at A6 (describing unprecedented loss of currency
by Japanese oil company Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K. in trading currency derivatives as example of
how sophisticated market player can be "trapped" by derivatives).
122. See Determined Loser, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at 82, 82 (noting Kashima was reticent
about oil losses despite questioning by Japan's oil regulator about currency dealings).
123. See Yen Blocked, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 96, 96 (blaming Toyota's loss of $935
million on inexperienced hedging).
124. See Simon Brady, Allied-Lyons' Deadly Game, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1991, at 22, 26-27
(describing how misjudgment of dollar's strength caused tremendous losses in one month).
125. See Klockner To Compensate CertificateHolders, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1989, at 10 (describing
oil futures losses of 700 million deutsche marks); Why Brent Needs Oiling ECONOMIST, Mar. 4,
1989, at 73, 73 (pegging Klockner's losses at $300 million).
126. See Audrey Choi, Metallgesellschaf Reports Progress On Oil Positions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28
1994, at A4 (stating that Metallgesellschaft's losses on oil derivatives contracts should not exceed
$859.8 million);Jack Egan, Wory Over Weird Investments, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 31,
1994, at 66 (placing Metallgesellschaft's losses around $1 billion); Terence Roth, German Firm's
Bailout Package Gets Approval WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1994, at A3 (reporting 120 bank creditors'
bailout of Metallgesellschaft from impending bankruptcy with $1.9 billion rescue package); Gall
E. Schares, The Meltdown at Metallgsellschaft . . ., Bus. WL., Jan. 24, 1994, at 48-49 (describing
"house of cards" at Metallgesellschaft); Leah Nathans Spiro .... And the Flames Singe Castle, Bus.
WK.,Jan. 24, 1994, at 49, 52 (reporting on implications of German firm's risky hedging to
American subsidiary); Jeffrey Taylor and Allanna Sullivan, Grman Firm Finds Hedges Can Be
Thorny, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 10, 1994, at Cl, C14 (describing ill-fated attempt to hedge using energy
derivatives); Steve Zwick and David Nusbaum, Trading Debacle Raises Questions, FUTURES, Feb.
1994, at 14, 14-15 (asserting Metallgesellschaft's attempts to liquidate position resulted in driving
down price of crude oil).
127. Taylor and Sullivan, supra note 126, at C14.
128. Taylor and Sullivan, supra note 126, at C14. Metallgesellschaft's mistake was hedging
long-term commitments with short term contracts that constantly had to be "rolled over," that
is, renewed every month at expiration. Id. Because historical price relationships showed that
the prices of these contracts generally went up as they aged, Metallgesellschaft anticipated
making a small profit with every rollover. Id. The first problem was that when exchange traders
learned of Metallgesellschaft's massive rollovers every month, they began to bet against the
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a flawed hedging strategy,129 the 14th largest industrial group in
Germany required an $1.9 billion emergency bailout from 120
creditors to avert bankruptcy proceedings.130 As many as 9000
workers are likely to lose their jobs. 131 Oil prices, already low, were
further depressed as the company attempted to liquidate its futures
positions.'3 2 As a collateral result of depressed oil prices, U.S. oil
refiners have foregone several hundred million dollars in revenue that
they would have received had Metallgesellschaft stayed out of the
"hedging" business. 133 Derivatives losses do not occur in a vacuum.
To date, such monumental losses have been more than offset by
record trading gains from derivatives. 134 The market exposure
revealed by these trades gone awry, however, lends credence to the
admonition of a well-known investment banker that derivatives may
be "financial hydrogen bombs," 35 capable of causing global economic gridlock should a string of large participants simultaneously
incur losses greater than their assets.
B.

Legal Risk

In 1991, the British House of Lords ruled that swaps transactions

company, gaining around $30 million a month at the company's expense. Id. Second,
Metallgesellschaft was purchasing as many as 120 times the number of futures contracts it
needed to offset its oil delivery exposure. See Spiro, supra note 126, at 52 ("When prices fell,
[Metallgesellschaft] gained only a fraction of what it lost in the futures market.").
129. See supra note 126 (describing Metallgesellschaft's ultimately unsuccessful speculative
attempts at hedging).
130. See Roth, supra note 126, at A3 (describing bailout that involved selling off some
subsidiaries of 58,000 employee Metallgesellschaft).
131. See Schares, supranote 126, at 49 (suggesting number of employees that are likely to
lose their jobs as the company sells non-core businesses).
132. See Taylor and Sullivan, supra note 126, at C14 (attributing decline in U.S. gasoline
prices by as much as five cents to Metallgesellschaft's attempted liquidation because gasoline
prices are linked to futures prices); Zwick and Nusbaum, supra note 126, at 15 (blaming attempted liquidation of Metallgesellschaft's position for decline of crude oil prices).
133. See Taylor and Sullivan, supra note 126, at C14 ("U.S. refiners may have seen their
profits reduced by as much as $200 million").
134. See supranotes 86-87 and accompanying text (describing huge profits from derivatives
trading).
135. See Heidi Fiske, Where Do We Gofrom Here?, INSWITUrIONAL INVESTOR, July 1992, at 209,
213 (quoting Felix Rohaym, senior partner, Lazard Fr~res & Co., as making dire assertion that
derivatives "have created unknown risks. Few understand these multiparty, multicountry
derivatives, and fewer still have thought through their implications."). Rohaytn warns that
derivatives are financial "hydrogen bombs" that must be defused before any major destruction
takes place. Id. Because trading in derivatives depends so heavily on computer models, and no
perfect computer model for derivatives has ever been created, the greatest risk of all may be a
flawed computer model. See Hansell, supra note 109, at 60 (discussing $33 million loss incurred
by Chemical Bank because its computer failed to account for difference between commercial
paper and Eurodollar volatility).
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entered into by local authorities were "ultra vires," 3 6 and therefore
legally unenforceable contracts.
This ruling, known as the
Hammersmith and Fulham decision,3 7 has cost eighty banks approximately $1 billion in defaulted swaps payments.138 The continued
assurances from legal counsel that the swaps contracts at issue were
enforceable 139 underscores the price of misjudgment and the urgent
need for legal clarity in the OTC derivatives arena.
C. Liquidity Risk
Liquidity is commonly defined as the ease with which an asset can
be bought or sold for money. 4 ° The two criteria for determining
liquidity are whether the asset can be traded: (1) quickly; and, (2) at
a reasonable price.'
Money, in the form of cash or demand
deposits, is the paradigm of perfect liquidity.4

136. See Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham L.B.C., 2 W.L.R. 372 (1991) (holding entrance
into swaps contract as beyond scope of local authority's power and therefore legally
unenforceable); see also GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 240 (defining "ultra vires act" as any act
performed without legal authority because such act is "beyond scope of powers of corporation,
state, province, or municipality").
137. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 123 (stating that volume of Hammersmith & Fulham's
swaps activity was so large compared to its debt that speculation was obvious aim, and implying
that speculative nature of transactions may have influenced ruling of ultra vires).
138. See British Local Authority Swaps; We're a Special Case, Old Chap, ECONOMIST, May 11, 1991,
at 74, 74 (pegging losses to 80 banks at £550 million); London's Legal Liabilities,ECONOMIST, Feb.
22, 1992, at 77, 77 (placing bank losses at over £500 million).
139. See Philip Moore, Cleaning Up the Town Hall Mess, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1991, at 31, 31
(noting that counterparties to Hammersmith & Fulham's swaps agreements had "engaged in
comprehensive cross-checks with lawyers and other responsible authorities to confirm that the
swap dealings were lawful"). The legal risk of contractual unenforceability may not be limited
to speculative English boroughs. See Gary Evans, Lawyers Warn on Void Swap Deals, EUROMONEY,
Apr. 1992, at 14, 14 (articulating legal opinion that other institutions, such as insurance
companies or building societies, may present ultra vires risk).
140.

See ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, EQUrITy MARKETS: STRUCTURE, TRADING, AND PERFORMANCE

523 (1988) (giving general meaning of liquidity). In contrast to this facile definition, Professor
Schwartz has identified several uncertainties regarding liquidity, including its definition and a
method to measure it empirically. Id. The definition is uncertain because of the subjective
nature of a "reasonable price." Id. at 524. A reasonable price to one buyer, indicating liquidity,
may be unreasonable to another. Id. Liquidity is difficult to measure empirically because the
OTC derivatives markets have not been tested in a crisis situation. See KEVIN WINCH & MARK
JICKLING, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERv., DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL MARKETS 34-35 (1993)
[hereinafter WINCH, CRS REPORT] (noting that despite lack of crisis testing growth of derivatives
products have been fostered by perception of liquidity in markets). But cf. Robert McGough,
ManagersBegin to Avoid MunicipalDerivatives,FearingLack of Liquidity DuringA BearMarke4 WALL
ST. J., Sept. 13, 1993, at C13 (describing investor disapproval of some complex derivatives
because of perception of illiquidity). Less market liquidity for a certain product means the
owner will have to discount the product more in order to sell it. Id.
141. SCHWARTZ, supra note 140, at 523.
142. SCHWARTZ, supra note 140, at 523.
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A liquid market has depth, 4 1 breadth,"4 and resiliency.145 Liquidity in the OTG derivatives markets is maintained by dealers, who
are prepared to create and sell the products in addition to holding
unmatched derivatives positions in their inventory. 146 If market
participants perceive that another participant is itself illiquid, 47 it
is unlikely that they would be willing to transact derivatives contracts
with that participant on mutually favorable terms for fear of the
Thus, while the liquidity of a
counterparty risk presented."4
particular derivative instrument is required for large transactions to
be absorbed by the market without significant price swings, the
liquidity of an individual entity must be presumed for that entity to
have access to the OTC derivatives markets.
1.

Delta hedging

Because hedging a risk by taking the exact opposite side of a
position-such as buying an option to sell that perfectly mirrors an
option to buy-would be safe yet unprofitable, many dealers and endusers use an arguably risky technique known as "delta hedging." 49
In a liquid market, this technique provides a manageable exposure to
Delta
risk, allowing for profits despite the existence of the hedge.'
hedging requires constant realignment of the balance between the
position and its hedge.15' When the market moves up or down, the
hedge must be readjusted in a manner that allows an optimally
desired exposure to risk.152 Two problems emerge from this tech-

143. See SCHWARTZ, supranote 140, at 36 (describing depth of market as multiple orders to
purchase at both above and below current trading value of asset in question).
144. See SCHWARTZ, supranote 140, at 36 (defining breadth of market as one in which orders
are sufficiently large).
145. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 140, at 36 (explaining resiliency of market as one in which
temporary price changes caused by order imbalances quickly lure buyers into market because
of attractive price).
146. See WINCH, CRS REPORT, supranote 140, at 34 ("[Tlhe liquidity of derivative contracts
is provided by the firms which make markets."). The unmatched contracts held in inventory
leave the dealer open to the market risk that their side of the contracts will decline in value.
See supranotes 108-35 and accompanying text (discussing potential pitfalls of market risk).
147. See WINCH, CRS REPORT, supranote 140, at 34 (defining corporation's illiquidity as lack
of enough money on hand to meet financial obligations).
148. See WINCH, CRS REPORT, supra note 140, at 34-35 (noting that fears of counterparty
bankruptcy renders illiquid firms unable to transact derivatives contracts).
149. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 86 (explaining that "delta hedge" matches market
response of underlying position over narrow range of price variations).
150. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1479 (identifying delta hedging as
means to hedge risk while allowing for profit).
151. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supranote 2, at 1479 (describing "repeated readjustments" essential to delta hedging).
152. See Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supranote 2, at 1479 (explaining necessity of repeated
readjustments in delta hedging in order to obtain "right balance of exposure between the
underlying and the option").
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nique. First, there are high transaction costs associated with the daily
readjustment of position. 5 ' Second, and more important, the
theory of delta hedging presupposes a liquid market in which to
transact readjustments.' 54 Market disruptions like those that occurred in 1987 and 1989 in the equities market, and the currency
crisis of September 1992, illustrate the illiquid conditions that can
make delta hedging readjustments an impossibility.'5 5 Thus, the
haven from market exposure supposedly afforded by hedging with
derivatives may prove useless in periods of high volatility. Unfortunately, this is precisely when protection from market exposure is most
56
needed.
2.

The lessons of portfolio insurance

The misguided use of "portfolio insurance" 5 7 in the October
1987 stock market crash'58 highlights one pitfall of hedging that can

153. See Hansell, supra note 109, at 60 (explaining how, as market moves, buyers are forced
to constantly buy high and sell low, losing money on every transaction). If a party to a
derivatives transaction loses money because of buying high and selling low, that party also incurs
transaction costs such as the commission paid to the intermediary who books the transaction.
The intermediary locates the counterparty, or in the absence of a counterparty, acts itself as a
counterparty to the transaction. This activity is done for a fee, and this fee is part of the high
transaction cost associated with delta hedging. See Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives, supra note 2,
at 1479 (discussing transaction costs in delta hedging of currency transactions).
154. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1479 (asserting that illiquid markets
make hedging impossible).
155. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1479 (giving lucid overview of
transaction costs and liquidity risks accompanying delta hedging); Richard Cookson & Lillian
Chew, Things Fail Apart, RsK, Oct. 1992, at 44, 44 (citing inability to effectuate delta hedging
in disrupted market scenario because of lack of liquidity); Fromson, supra note 117, at D14
(quoting George Soros: "If there is an overwhelming amount of dynamic hedging to be done
in the same direction, price movements may become discontinuous."). Mr. Soros, a well-known
hedge fund manager, lost $600 million trading bond and currency derivatives in 1993. Id.
156. SeeHu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supranote2, at 1479 (analogizing inability to effectuate
delta hedging during market disruptions to ineffective protection afforded by portfolio insurance
during 1987 stock market crash); see also Hayne Leland, PortfolioInsurance: The Lessons ofHistoy,
RiSK, Dec. 1992, at 15, 16 (describing paradoxical increase in market volatility caused by
portfolio insurance during market disruption); Mary L. Schapiro, The Growth of the Synthetic
Derivative Market: Risks and Benefits, Address at the National Option & Futures Society 13
(Nov. 13, 1991) (on file with The American University Law Review) (discussing how portfolio
insurance, with programmed sell orders, greatly increased selling pressure during market break
in 1987). SEC Commissioner Schapiro questions whether hedging strategies currently being
employed bear any resemblance to the portfolio strategies that exacerbated the market crash
in 1987. Schapiro, supra, at 13-14.
157. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 175 (defining portfolio insurance technique as attempt
to change market exposure through futures and cash markets); Peter Fortune, Stock Market
Crashes: What Have We LearnedFrom October 1987?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar./Apr. 1993, at 10,
11 (describing portfolio insurance as "set of strategies" designed to prevent value of portfolio
from falling below prespecified floor).
158. See WINCH, CRS REPORT, supranote 140, at 36 (describing 37% drop in value of Dow
Jones Industrial Average over period of less than two months precipitated by crash on October
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occur to unwary investors in a liquidity crisis.159 An example of a
"portfolio insurance" strategy is attempting to hedge equity exposure
by purchasing derivatives that increase in value as the underlying
equity prices devalue."6 As prices decline, the strategy calls for
selling equity shares and buying puts' on futures.
The striking resemblance between this technique and delta hedging
is not coincidental. Portfolio insurance is, in fact, a form of delta
hedging. 6 2 In ordinary market conditions prior to the crash,
portfolio insurance strategies effectively hedged equity portfolios
against small fluctuations in prices. When the market declined
sharply on October 19, however, the crush of portfolio insurance
hedgers rushing to sell equities and buy puts encountered illiquid
conditions.'6 3 That is, there were no buyers for the equities and no
sellers of the derivatives at a reasonable price. Thus, because of the
fallacious assumption of liquidity, portfolio insurance users were
unable to avoid substantial losses through the use of dynamic
hedging. 1"4
The shortcomings of portfolio insurance strategy are well documented. Yet in apparent disregard of the precedent liquidity crisis,
one manager of investment programs recently stated he was "fully

19, 1987).
159. See Emerging Market Options; More a Shrub Than a Hedge, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1994, at
91 (describing the inability to effectuate delta hedging during market disruptions); Leland, supra
note 156, at 16; Schapiro, supra note 156, at 13. In its 1991 study on the OTC derivatives
market, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) cited increased volume in S&P 500
contracts since 1987 as proof that end-users are increasingly choosing options over portfolio
insurance as hedging vehicles. CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, OTC DERIVATIVE MARKEr
STUDY 9 (1991). Hedging may also be transformed into catastrophic speculation by a variety of
human errors. See supranote 126 and accompanying text (describing failed hedging strategy
employed by Metallgesellschaft).
160. SeeEarl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Bearish but Nervy? Try These Market Plays, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
1994, at Cl ("Put options gain in price when the underlying stocks or indexes decline.").
161. See Emerging Market Options; More a Shrub Than a Hedge, supra note 159, at 88 (defining
put as right to sell derivative).
162. See Saul Hansell, Is the World Ready for Synthetic Equity?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug.
1990, at 59 (describing portfolio insurance as "type of dynamic hedge in which investor sells
futures"); GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 94 (defining dynamic hedging as technique of portfolio
insurance).
163. SeeJoseph Grundfest, ExplainingtheEvents ofOctober1987inAFER THE CRASH: LINKAGES
BETwEEN STOCKS & FUTuRES 23, 23-24 (Robert J. Mackay ed., 1988) (suggesting users of
portfolio insurance "may not have correctly understood the limits of that trading strategy").
164. See Peter L. Bernstein & Barbara S. Bernstein, Where the Postcrash Studies Went Wrong,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 1988, at 173 (describing "illusion of an almost unlimited
liquidity"). As a corollary risk, there is a belief that the widespread use of dynamic hedging
strategies during market disruptions exacerbates market declines. SeeAnita Raghavan, Bearish
Bets Turn Some into Bulls, WALL ST.J., Feb. 17, 1994, at Cl, C117 (stating that when speculators
are flocking to purchase puts they are "indirectly adding to the selling pressure in the stock
market"). The discussion of derivatives' impact on the underlying cash markets, while fertile
ground for scholarly discourse, is outside the scope of this Comment.
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ready to delta hedge our position with futures if [the market] started
'
turning against us."165
But would the market for these hedges be
liquid if a significant number of investors attempted to transact them
at the same time?1"
During a market crash, the widespread,
erroneous belief of liquidity could cause a stampede to sell or buy.
Ironically, the perception of liquidity would partially cause the
67
ensuing illiquidity
D.

Credit Risk

The "credit risk" in an OTC derivative transaction is the risk that a
participant will default on contractual obligations to a counterparty,
resulting in loss." For exchange-traded products, there is a central
clearinghouse16 9 that stands as a guarantee to all buyers and sellers
that their trades will be consummated, regardless of counterparty
default. 7 Because OTC derivatives participants deal directly with
165. Monroe & Arterian, supra note 65, at 39.
166. See Barbara D. Granito, Delta-Hedging. The New Name in Portfolio Insurance,WALL ST.J.,
Mar. 17, 1994, at Cl, C13 (stating that puts are in demand in declining markets because they
allow "buyers to stop their losses at a preset floor"). In addition to the stock market crash,
investors seeking to use this stop-loss strategy have also been taught "painful lessons" in the
recent European bond market crash. Id. at C13; see also EmergingMarket Options; More a Shrub
Than a Hedge, supra note 159, at 91 ("If bond prices fall too quickly... those who have sold put
options cannot re-balance fast enough."). The same hedging conundrum presented itself in the
European currency crisis of September 1992. See EmergingMarket Options; More a Shrub Than a
Hedge, supra note 159, at 91 (noting that currency options dealers lost vast sums because of
inability to effectuate dynamic hedging readjustments).
167. Nobel Laureate Merton H. Miller has termed this phenomenon "the paradox of
liquidity." See MERTON H. MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS AND MARKET VOLATILITY 46 (1991)

[hereinafter MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS] (comparing liquidity of capital markets to liquidity
of depository institutions which can have illiquid runs made on deposits because of perception
of liquidity) ;JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 16061 (1935) (asserting that although investor "flatters himself that his investment isliquid... this
cannot be true for all investors collectively").
168. Credit risk has a market component as well. Interview with Tanya S. Beder, Managing
Director of Capital Market Advisors, in Washington, D.C. (July 24, 1993) [hereinafter Beder
Interview] (noting that change in market value of derivative creates corresponding change of
credit exposure to transactional counterparty).
169. See SINGAPORE INT'L MONETARY EXCHANGE LTD., SIMEX FINANCIAL SAFEGUARD SYSTEM
3 (Dec. 1992) ("Clearing simply means that all the buy and sell transactions are matched to
ensure that every single transaction is accounted for and that the trade details are correctly
recorded. The clearing house ...substitutes itself [for market participants] ...in every cleared
trade and assumes the opposite side of all positions.") Clearinghouses thus obviate the need to
rely on the credit quality of one's de facto counterparty.
170. SeeJohn Davidson, Prospectsfor a Swaps ClearingHo=se FUTURES & OPTIONS PLUS, Sept.
6, 1993, at 9, 9 (describing "clearinghouse" as organization established by market participants
that imposes "discipline on their market" and serves to minimize risk by sharing risks equally
should loss occur). Plans to study the creation of a central clearinghouse for the OTC
derivatives market are currently under way. Evrard Van Hertsen, A New Horizon, CLEARING &
SErrLEMENT,July/Aug. 1993, at 21, 22 (describing multilateral clearing schemes being examined
as means to more efficiently manage risk). Federal Reserve Governor Susan Phillips has called
the evolution of an OTC clearinghouse "the next logical development." Phillips Urges Adoption
ofBilateralNetting Planto Promote Enforceability,DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 14,1994,

1048

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1023

each other without the benefit of an exchange clearinghouse,
credit for assurance that
counterparties must rely on each other's
171
met.
be
will
obligations
contractual
To assess credit risk at any given time, a participant must determine
the cost of replacing the contract should a counterparty default occur.
To find the replacement cost of a derivatives contract in default, one
must calculate the value of all expected future cash flows that were
erased by the default. 172 Because the value of a derivatives contract
fluctuates throughout the contract's life, evaluating credit risk requires
a determination of both "current exposure and "potential" exposure. 173 Current replacement costs for swaps are calculated as the
discounted present value of the cash flow a counterparty is expected
to receive during the life of the contract. 74 Current value can
therefore be calculated precisely.
Future credit exposure, which changes constantly as volatility moves
variables involving both the underlying security and the derivative
itself, is much more difficult to gauge. For example, options undergo
a devaluation of their worth as the period prior to the expiration date
diminishes, known as "time decay." 75 This "wasting asset" 76 characteristic of an option, called the "theta,"' 77 is a variable that alters
the future value of derivatives.
Determining the replacement cost of a derivative contract requires
computer modeling of the volatility 78 of both the underlying and
associated variables, such as time decay. Unfortunately, this is an
imprecise science. 79 According to a prominent economist, measurat A48.
171. See Beese, Risk Management, supra note 86, at 6 (identifying credit risk as "the biggest
issue... participants in this market assume").
172. GROUP OF THiRTY REPORT, supranote 4, at 47.
173. See GROUP OF THIRlY REPORT, supra note 4, at 47 (explaining that credit risk of
derivatives contract fluctuates because underlying variables fluctuate).
174. SeeJamroz, supra note 31, at 901 (explaining how to determine current replacement cost
for swap in event of default).
175. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 235 (defining "time decay" as "loss in value of an option
or an instrument with an embedded option as the expiration date approaches").
176. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 234 (defining "wasting asset" as rate of time decay in
option).
177. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 234 (defining "theta" of option as "sensitivity of option's
value to the passage of time with price of the underlying and implied volatility unchanged").
178. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1477-80 (discussing empirical
uncertainty in estimating volatility because theoretical models are often based on unrealistic
assumptions).
179. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 8 (stating that while evaluation of credit exposure is
imprecise science, corrections in price or rate discounts and suitable premiums can "adjust for
reasonable differences in credit exposure"). Gastineau, director of customer risk management
for Swiss Bank Corporation, asserts that "(flinancial intermediaries closely scrutinize the credit
risk element ... because most intermediaries have experienced sizable credit losses in recent
years." Id.
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ing volatility "depends on judgment and personal opinion about what
the future will look like."180 Seemingly minute alterations in assumptions about variable factors can cause gargantuan swings in the
contract, as well as in the attendant
replacement value of a derivative
81
potential credit exposure.
Counterparty credit risk is a primary concern to derivatives endusers.18 2 Although counterparty credit has always been important
to banks in standard underwriting, the longer duration of OTC
derivatives transactions increases the risk that a counterparty will
default. 3 Participants in the OTC derivatives markets may need to
rely on each other's financial viability for decades, rather than the few
months required to create and market a bond issue." 4 Wall Street,
with its traditional emphasis on short-term risk,8 5 may look 8for
6
short-term profits attached to unwanted long-term repercussions.

180.

See Kenneth S. Leong, Estimates, Guesstimatesand Rules of Thumb, in FROM BLACK-SCHOLES

TO BLACK HOLES: NEW FRONTIERS IN OPTIONS 63, 67 (1992) (describing volatility estimation as

"weakest link" in options valuation, and noting that "most people seem to pull [volatility
estimations] from thin air"); see also Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 39, at 72 (quoting Fischer
Black, co-author of BLACK-SCHOLES seminal options volatility model, as stating that "we can't
track everything perfectly. It's a never-ending task to identify possible glitches.").
181. Beder Interview, supra note 168 (asserting that "no one model is correct," and that $30
million swing in assumptions on $3.5 billion trade "has to be called zero"). While some fear that
pricing models make improper assumptions about liquidity and market volatility, no better
modeling system has been suggested to date. See BANK OF ENGLAND, DERIVATIVES: REPORT OF
AN INTERNAL WORKING GROUP 44 (1993) [hereinafter BANK OF ENGLAND, DERIVATIMES] (noting
lack of academic modeling solution to replace current price modeling inadequacy).
182. See Tracy Corrigan, Salomon Sets Up Tiple-A Rated Derivatives Unit, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1993, at 19 (noting that declining credit quality of U.S. financial institutions has proven "severe
handicap" in derivatives market because "potential clients are unwilling to deal with institutions
rated less than double A"); Michael Peltz, WallStreet's Triple-AforEffort,INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
May 1993, at 89, 89 (explaining how risk-averse clients are requiring AA credit rating or better
before they will consider engaging in derivatives transactions); Flavio Bartmann, Special Purpose
Derivative Vehicles, Remarks at the IBC Financial Focus Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Conference 1 (Apr. 20, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review) (stating that
credit concerns over downgrade in U.S. investment banks in early 1990s caused exclusion of
several major banks from large segment of swaps market).
183. Steven Dickson, Swaps Issuers Taking a Close Look at Firms' Credit Quality, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 2, 1992, at 13.
184. Id.
185. See Beese, OTC Derivatives, supra note 27, at 5 (noting that "credit risk involved in these
transactions is the first long-term risk brokerage houses have assumed on a systematic basis");
cf. Newcomb, supra note 109, at 14 (finding risks associated with derivatives to be "logical
evolution and extension of those basic risk-taking capabilities... [that] bankers have always
handled, with the same essential components").
186. See Dickson, supranote 183, at 13 (discussing fear of"transactions done for short-term
results, without regard for potential long-term complications"). SEC Commissioner Beese notes:
"[T]his is the first time broker-dealers have been in the business of longer-term credit
extension---except, of course, for their short-lived experience with bridge loans. Some of those
90 day loans may still be on the books!" See Beese, OTC Derivatives, supranote 27, at 5. Bridge
loans are unsecured loans from broker-dealers used to fund a party's takeover of a company.
See Christopher Farrell, Investment Banking Takes a New-and Risky-Turn, BUS. WL, June 15,
1987, at 92, 92 (defining bridge financing as short-term loan made when both time and money
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The credit rating of an OTC derivatives dealer is more closely
scrutinized than that of a stocks and bonds trader because the OTC
derivatives dealer is an actual party to the contract. 18 7 Because OTC
derivatives contracts are negotiated privately between parties, financial
gain is entirely dependent on the continued ability of the
counterparty to perform contractual obligations.1 88 As a result of
18 9
contractual performance risks and the relatively long maturity of
swaps and related products, central banks have established strict
minimum-credit requirements for counterparties with whom they will
transact OTC derivatives business 9 ° This increased emphasis on
counterparty credit quality has occurred simultaneously with a global
decrease in the credit quality of banks.'9 '
1.

Derivativeproduct companies

To avoid losing credit-wary customers, three investment banks have
created AAA-rated subsidiary derivatives units.'92
These units,

are of essence). Once the party successfully gains control of its target, it uses proceeds from the
company's issuance of debt to repay its bridge loan to the broker dealer. Id.
187. See Saul Hansell, Newly Formed Salomon Unit Receives Top CreditRating, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
9, 1993, at D1, D7 (explaining that derivatives dealer, as counterparty to privately negotiated
contract, is highly scrutinized as to whether it will be able to meet contractual obligations for
five years or longer).
188. See Lisa M. Raiti, Credit Sensitivity Spurs Enhanced DPC Growth, STANDARD & POOR'S
CREDTwEEK, May 18, 1992, at 35, 36 (articulating necessity of continued counterparty
creditworthiness to allow realization of financial gain in OTC derivative transaction).
189. See Fred R. Bleakley, ManagingRisk: CorporateTreasurersAdopt Hedging Plans, With Some
Wariness,WALL ST.J., Aug. 17, 1993, atAl (quotingAlliedSignal Corporation corporate treasurer
Roger Matthews as complaining that "[s]ome of the ... [derivatives] with bells and whistles
force you to take bets four and five years out"). "Bells and whistles" is a term that ostensibly
suggests unusual or custom-made features of a financial instrument, but has become a pejorative
term describing features that are added merely to attract attention. GASrINEAu, supra note 7,
at 36. Some companies are attempting to delay employees' profit-based bonuses so they can
monitor the profitability of the long-term positions. See Jill Dutt, Derivative Trading High
Profit-HighRisk, GAZETTE (MoNTREAL), May 12,1992, at D12 (describing Salomon Brothers pay
plan implemented by former interim chairman Warren Buffet that ties compensation for
derivatives experts to long-term profitability).
190. SeeTim Farrand, Banks Fight CreditFearswith New Derivative Units, Reuters, Feb. 12, 1993,
availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (describing increasingly credit-conscious nature of
derivatives clients).
191. See id. (noting that Standard and Poor's has only six banks globally with highest credit
rating of AAA, whereas five years ago there were 12); Peltz, supra note 182, at 89 (explaining
that many institutions' credit ratings were downgraded during recession to merely A, causing
derivatives end-users to do business with only highest rated banks or to require counterparties
to put up collateral for deals to be consummated).
192. See Peltz, supra note 182, at 89-90 (describing credit-enhanced derivative product
companies (DPCs) formed by Merrill Lynch, Goldman, Sachs & Co., and Salomon Brothers in
response to increased credit sensitivity of end-users). The first DPC, Merrill Lynch Derivative
Products (MLDP), was capitalized with $350 million, including $300 million in common equity
from Merrill Lynch and $50 million from outside investors. See Bartmann, supra note 182, at 3
(discussing capitalization necessary for DPC to exceed market's minimum requirement and be
taken seriously). It has been noted that a AAA rating at this level of capitalization costs "$117
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known as "enhanced derivative products companies" (DPCs), are
formed by financial services firms and are able to attain higher credit
ratings than their parent companies. 19 Higher ratings are possible
because the DPCs are separately capitalized, 194 requiring no assistance from the parent companies to perform their contractual
obligations. 95 Adequate capitalization alone, however, is insufficient
to ensure that a DPC will achieve a higher rating than its parent
company. The DPC is not sufficiently independent of the parent to
merit a higher rating if, in the event of bankruptcy, a bankruptcy
court has valid grounds to consolidate the assets and liabilities of a
196
DPC with that of the parent company.
The DPCs focus exclusively on intermediating derivatives transactions and are thus removed from the credit exposure to third-world
debt or nonperforming real estate loans that have saddled full-service
financial institutions.'97 Risk-averse counterparties, however, are still

million per A." Peltz, supranote 182, at 89.
Flavio Bartmann, developer of MLDP, determined the appropriate level of capitalization by
analyzing the fundamental elements of a credit rating. See Bartmann, supra note 182, at 1
(defining "credit rating" as "simply a measure of the probability over time that the assets of a
firm, after defaults, exceed the liabilities"). He concluded that an AAA-rated company could
be designed by first "maintain[ing] a small risk to capital ratio through high quality assets and
plenty of capital; and second, generat[ing] sufficient income to consistently and comfortably
cover expenses." Id. at 2.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. capitalized its DPC, called GS Financial Products, with an existing $350
million portfolio, only $70 million of which represented Goldman's equity stake. Peltz, supra
note 182, at 91. Salomon Brothers capitalized "Swapco," its AAA subsidiary with only $175
million. Id. at 90. It should be noted that these AAA subsidiaries have only been created by
investment banks.
193. See Raiti, supra note 188, at 35 (defining "DPC" as company with AAA credit rating
despite lower credit rating of parent company).
194. Capital adequacy for purposes of credit rating is determined by complex probabilistic
risk models that examine a full spectrum of potential exposures, including disaster scenarios.
Raiti, supranote 188, at 38-39 (relating that DPC worthy of AAA rating should have "extremely
high probability of meeting its financial obligations as a counterparty").
195. See Raiti, supranote 188, at 35 (describing AAA DPG as sum of portfolio, capital, and
separateness, thereby indicating ability of DPG to fulfill financial obligations without support of
parent company).
196. See Raiti, supra note 188, at 38 (describing Standard and Poor's primary concern in
parent-subsidiary relationship as "separateness of an enhanced DPC and insulation of capital
from a legal, operational, and regulatory standpoint"); Bartmann, supra note 182, at 2 (articulating essentiality of 'bankruptcy-remote" nature of DPC to achieve AAA credit rating). MLDP
received a AAA rating, compared with Merrill Lynch's A1/A+, by showing a consolidation in the
event of the parent's bankruptcy to be an impossibility. Id. at 2.
197. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text (stating that DPC is not bound by
liabilities of parent company and therefore not involved with loans to lesser developed countries,
real estate bubble loans, or highly leveraged transaction loans that may be troubling parent
institution); see alsoJohn L. Carr, Jr. & John H. More, Developments in the Regulation of Foreign
Bank Operations in the United States, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 225, 273 (noting problems that
traditional financial institutions have experienced in real estate and third-world markets).
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likely to prefer an official AAA to a credit-enhanced Wall Street
subsidiary.198
2.

Default rate

The derivatives industry has touted an extremely low default rate of
less than one-half of one percent of the money at risk in OTC
swaps19 9 transactions.2" But with the continued explosion of the
market, 20 and the recent spate of large market losses, 2°2 will the
industry be able to maintain this impressive rate of default for all
derivatives transactions? Arguably, as the market continues to expand,
the credit quality of the participants will decline. 0 3 In addition, it
is possible that previously performing swaps contracts, currently
included in the low default rate, may still default at some point in the
future. This could occur following billion dollar market losses like
those that occurred at Metallgesellschaft, Showa Shell Sekiyu, and
Kashima Oil. 20 4 A handful of billion dollar defaults would significandy skew the default rate for derivatives.20 5
An interesting analogy can be drawn between the rate of default for
swaps and the rate of default for junk bonds. 206 Reminiscent of the
198. See Peltz, supra note 182, at 92 (explaining preference for true AAA bank J.P. Morgan
over DPC subsidiaries based on greater capitalization and "blue-chip name"); cf Salomon'sSwapco
is Running on EmptyJust as Fannie and Sallie Mae Make Synthetic Triple-A Debuts, DERIVATIVES WK.,
Oct. 11, 1993, at 1 (describing recent approval for immediate use of DPCs by Federal National
Mortgage Association and Student Loan Marketing Association). These quasi-government
agencies needed board approval to transact derivatives business with synthetic DPCs.
199. See supranotes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing swaps as most prevalent form
of OTC derivative contract).
200. See Claudia Cummins, Q and A: Swaps Industry is Self-Regulating Chairman Says, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 28, 1993, at 3, 3 (quotingJoseph P. Bauman, Chairman of ISDA, as saying "[l]ess
than one-half of one percent of the market value of all swaps has been lost due to credit
defaults"); Floyd Norris, Swaps Markets: How Much Risk?, N.Y. TIMEJuly 29, 1992, at D8 (stating
swaps market losses amount to one-half of one percent of market of $77.5 billion, which is
amount actually at risk).
201. Seesupra note 48 and accompanying text (describing extraordinary growth of derivatives
markets).
202. See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text (describing massive derivatives trading
losses).
203. See Hansell & Muehring, supra note 53, at 53 (articulating this phenomenon as
regulatory concern).
204. See supranotes 121 and 126 (detailing losses).
205. See Norris, supra note 200, at D8 (totalling all derivatives losses at $358 million).
206.

See VICTOR SPERANDEO WITH T. SULLIVAN BROwN, TRADER VIC - METHODS OF A WALL

STREET MASTER 276 (1991) (defining junk bonds as general term for bonds issued to finance
leveraged buyouts). Sperandeo notes they earned their title junk" "because so many of the
bond issues depreciated dramatically in market value after the issue because the market value
of the underlying assets securing them depreciated. There was no other collateral." Id. Former
Federal Reserve Vice Chairman David MullinsJr. suggested an analogy between the junk bond
default rate and that of derivatives. See Hansell & Muehring, supra note 53, at 53 ("For years
people convinced themselves that the high-yield market only had a 3 percent default rate. But
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low default rate put out by the International Swaps & Derivatives
Association, Inc. (ISDA), the junk bond "industry"" 7 held out
studies in the 1980s that showed a two to three percent default rate
for their product... 8 Yet subsequent studies that viewed junk bonds
as they matured found the default rate to be between thirty and fifty
percent."° This is not to suggest that derivatives will have default
rates as high as junk bonds, or that the two industries will share the
same fate. It merely suggests that, like junk bonds, low default rates
for derivatives may not be reliable because defaults are likely to
increase as time goes on."' This possibility is heightened by the
long durations of many OTC derivatives transactions."
E. Systemic Risk
"Systemic risk

22

actually refers to two scenarios. In the first, the

those studies were done in an expanding market dominated by recently issued bonds.").
207. See Bensman, supra note 113, at 136 (describing Drexel's 50% share ofjunk market);
David Dreman, Never Give ajunk Holderan Even Break, FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 446, 446 (stating
that in 1980s industry was dominated by Michael Milken and his firm Drexel Burnham
Lambert).
208. SeeJames Buchan, Enigmatic Securities, FIN. TIMES, June 26, 1989, at 4 (citing study by
New York University's Edward Altman in March 1988 that found average rate of junk bond
default between 1978 and 1987 to be 1.84%); Dreman, supra note 207, at 446 (describing
Hickman study of 1940-45 and T.R. Akinson study of 194565 showing default rate for junk
bonds of merely two percent).
209. See Buchan, supra note 208, at 4 (describing study by Harvard business school's Paul
Asquith that shows 34% ofjunk bonds issued in 1979 had defaulted); Dreman, supra note 207,
at 446 (stating that restructurings of defaults where junk bond holders only get 20-30 cents on
dollar bring default rate from late 1970s to mid-1980s "closer to 50%"); Hansell & Muehring,
supra note 53, at 53 (describing David Mullins Jr.'s most recent study as Harvard professor
showing default rate for junk bonds that have been aged 10 years to be 30%).
210. See Buchan, supra note 208, at 4 ("Junk bonds, like other debt securities, are more likely
to default as time goes on."). By November 1988, Paul Asquith's Harvard study found that 34%
of bonds issued in 1977 and 1978 had defaulted, while default rate percentages for bonds issued
between 1979 and 1983 were in the low 20s, and the default rate for bonds issued between 1979
and 1983 were under 10%. Id. These declining default rate percentages cannot be attributed
to the issuance of better quality junk bonds as time went on. To the contrary, the quality of
junk bonds issued throughout the 1980s deteriorated markedly. See Dreman, supranote 207,
at 446 (stating that the "new junk [in the 1980s] was definitely inferior to the old junk").
211. See supranotes 183-84 and accompanying text (explaining why longer time frame creates
greater credit fears).
212. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETILEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK
NETTING SCHEMES OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES 9 (1990) [hereinafter BIS NETTING
SCHEMES REPORT] (describing systemic risk as risk that "illiquidity or failure of one institution,
and its resulting inability to meet its obligations when due, will lead to the illiquidity or failure
of other institutions"); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
SysTEMIC RISKS IN SECURITIES MARKETS 14 (1991) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (quoting Sean
O'Connor of Bank of Canada: "systemic risk is the financial risk that arises from institutional
and structural arrangements in markets which all participants (in the economy) must bear as
a group"); KEVIN F. WINCH & MARKJICKLING, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PROFITS OF
BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS: LOOKING FOR THE GREENEST GRASS 26 (quoting E. Gerald
Corrigan, then-President of Federal Reserve Bank of New York: "[B]y systemic risk I mean the
clear and present danger that problems in financial institutions can quickly be transmitted to
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inability of one bank to meet its contractual obligations will result in
a domino effect, toppling one financial institution after another.1 3
In the second scenario, the widespread reliance of investors on
dynamic hedging strategies during a market disturbance could turn
an otherwise containable market downturn into an illiquidity-driven
crash.214 Widespread fears of the systemic risks posed by OTC
derivatives have prompted regulators worldwide to sound warnings
and undertake studies of the market. 2 5 Regulatory concern about
derivatives officially began when former New York Federal Reserve
Bank president E. Gerald Corrigan 216 warned that "[t]he growth
and complexity of off-balance sheet activities and the nature of the

other institutions or markets, thereby inflicting damage to those other institutions, their
customers and, ultimately, the economy at large.").
213. See Stephen Lipin & William Power, DerivativesDraw Warningfrom Regulators,WALL ST.
J., Mar. 25, 1992, at Cl, C9 (raising concern that "domino effect could drag down other
institutions with obligations due from the failed one"); Beese, OTC Derivatives, supra note 27,
at 7 (discussing possibility of one insolvency being transmitted to other firms throughout entire
financial system).
214. See supranotes 157-64 and accompanying text (describing failure of dynamic hedging
"portfolio insurance" during 1987 market crash). Another example of a liquidity crisis causing
a major disturbance in the financial markets is that of Penn Central Railroad in 1970. The
failure of this major participant in the commercial paper market led to a "crisis of confidence"
in that market, causing illiquid conditions in the marketplace. See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK RELATIONS, REPORT
PREPARED BY A WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED BY THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN

COUNTRIES 30 (1992) [hereinafter BIS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REPORT] (describing illiquidity
shocks delivered to commercial paper market by Penn Central Railroad).
215. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 7 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2) (A) (Supp. IV 1992)
(requiring Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to conduct study in order to find
ways to better protect hedgers and speculators, producers of futures, and public at large);
Patrick Harverson, It's Time to Know What's GoingOn, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, § 3, at 2 (referring
to Bank of England Study undertaken to determine whether derivatives users fully understand
derivatives); Lee, supra note 106, at 46 (listing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
General Accounting Office (GAO), National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC),
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) as regulatory agencies and groups that are studying OTC derivatives
market); J. Carter Beese, Jr., The Great Derivatives Debate: Where Do We Go from Here,
Remarks at the Risk Magazine/CATS Software Symposium 2 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Beese,
Great Derivatives Debate] (on file with The American University Law Review) (noting Japanese
Ministry of Finance's ban on derivatives that immediately caused market to move to Singapore,
New York, and London). Concern has been voiced over the bandwagon of regulatory
respondents to systemic risk. See Brady Warns of Risks Posedby Swaps Market, Urges One Regulator,
24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1885, 1888 (Dec. 25, 1992) (noting former Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady's call for one regulator to examine systemic risks).
216. Mr. Corrigan, having resigned from his position as President of the New York Federal
Reserve, remains Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements' Banking Supervisory
Committee. See Hansell & Muehring, supra note 53, at 49 (describing Corrigan's competence
to probe derivatives as result of his experience resolving banking scandals); Kelley Holland,
Corrigan Cultivates Role as Defender of the Fed, AM. BANKER, Oct. 14, 1992, at 1, 9 (quoting Henry
Kaufman, former Chief Economist at Salomon Brothers, Inc., as stating that "Jerry [Corrigan]
has developed great skills when it comes to judging systemic risks").
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credit, price and settlement risk they entail should give us all cause
for concern. 2 17
Most OTC derivatives transactions are unsecured.2 1 ' Following
substantial market losses, there is the risk that the failure of one
significant participant to make payments could result in their
counterparty's suspension of payments, causing a rapid, global
transmission of defaults to numerous participants wedded to the
initial failed participant by OTC derivatives contracts. This risk is
heightened by the fact that much of the derivatives business is
concentrated in a small number of banks. 9 It is further exacerbated by the interconnection of swap obligations among these institu22
tions22' and the long-term nature of the transactions. '
OTC derivatives are widely used for unhedged, proprietary
speculation, 222 increasing fears that a major bank could fail from
trading losses and cause systemic breakdown.223 One reason for the

217. See Corrigan, supra note 106, at 12-14 (stating, in regulatory shot heard around
derivatives world, that "high-tech banking and finance has its place, but it's not all that it's
cracked up to be.... I hope this sounds like a warning, because it is.").
218. See Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 3, at 103 (noting that most OTC derivatives
transactions are "unsecured and exposed to ever-more-volatile interest-rate, currency, and futures
markets").
219. See Glasgall & Javetski, supra note 3, at 105 (noting that many traders restrict their
business to small group of highly rated banks, such as Morgan, Bankers Trust, and Union Bank
of Switzerland).
220. See Rendleman, supranote 28, at 30 (expressing regulators' concern over interconnection of swap risks that result from bank intermediation); A.B. Krongard, If the Swaps Come
Unglued, Watch Out!, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 3, at 13 (discussing number of interconnected
institutions, "the unique nature of the components, and potential abuse of leverage" as factors
multiplying systemic risk); Lisa Vaughan, Swaps Boom Worries Regulators, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 25,
1992, at 19 (quoting Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Governor of Bank of England, as warning that "we
must be alert to the possibility that through increasing the links between different financial
markets, heavy use of derivatives could in some circumstances actually increase systemic risk").
The demand for sophisticated, creditworthy counterparties has concentrated the derivatives
intermediary market among a handful of banking intermediaries, leading to a tangled web of
transactions.
See Blaming the System, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993, at 36, 36 (examining
interconnected network of central and interbank links that adds risk to system). The network
of transactions also stems from the fact that most swap participants run entire portfolios, not
single swaps. See Keith Schap, When Domino Theoy Meets OTC Credit Risk, FUTURES, Aug. 1992,
at 38, 40 (using Merrill Lynch's subsidiary as example, with "161 transactions involving only 51
counterparties, an average of more than three deals to a counterparty"); Glasgall & Javetski,
supra note 3, at 104 (noting single finance deal that took 240 swaps to balance).
221. See Claire Makin, Hedging Your DerivativesDoubts, INSTITTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1991,
at 113, 119 (noting that "it's the long-dated transactions that cause concern"); Vaughan, supra
note 220, at 19 (articulating fears of Richard Farrant, deputy head of banking supervision at
Bank of England, that lengthening timeframe of transactions increases potential exposure to
counterparty default); supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing enhanced credit
risks attendant to longer duration of derivatives participants' exposure).
222. See Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 39, at 64-65 (describing speculation as common use
for derivatives); supranotes 110-33 and accompanying text (listing some enormous speculative
losses).
223. See Hansell, supra note 109, at 65 (noting possibility and danger of large losses in
derivatives trading); supranotes 212-21 and accompanying text (examining possibility of chain
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popularity of derivatives as speculative devices is the exceptional
leverage that they give to users.2 24 For options that are far "out of
the money,'' 22 ' a $1000 capital expenditure
can control as much as
2 26
$1 million of equity, debt, or currency.
Although derivatives are used primarily as hedging vehicles, 7 as
stated above, many of the hedging strategies employed by participants
reflect an unrealistic assumption of liquidity.228 Thus, dynamic
hedging strategies could fail when hedging is most greatly needed.
It is not difficult to envision, then, both systemic scenarios articulated
in this Comment occurring simultaneously: (1) the OTC derivatives
dealer unable to hedge market exposure would fail from trading
losses, 229 defaulting on outstanding derivatives obligations and
igniting a chain reaction of such defaults in other dealers; and, (2) by
attempting to effectuate dynamic hedging, participants would severely
increase selling pressure on an already crashing market.23 0 Presum-

reaction that could seriously affect world markets). Yet, the proposition that derivatives actually
decrease systemic risk has strong anecdotal evidence. Vast improvement in the financial health
of banks has coincided with the growth of the derivatives market. See FDIC to Close 15 Offices,
Dismiss 3,300 Employees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1993, at A14 (noting number of bank failures
shrank from 122 in 1992 to 34 in 1993 and that FDIC downsizing reflects improved health of
banking industry). Improved health in the banking industry is substantially the result of
profitable plays in the derivatives markets. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text
(attributing banks' record trading profits to derivatives transactions).
224. See Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 39, at 62 (explaining that common use for
derivatives is speculation and that derivatives give speculators "tremendous leverage").
225. See GASTINEAu, supra note 7, at 166 (defining "out of the money" as option that has no
intrinsic value because underlying security is trading at price lower than exercise price of option
to buy or less than exercise price of option to sell). An example of an option that is far "out
of the money" would be an option to buy a security at $110 per share when the underlying
security is currently trading at $90 per share.
226. See Lenzner & Heuslein, supra note 39, at 64 (illustrating leverage of derivatives by
examining George Soros' $1.5 billion derivatives gain from betting against weak currencies in
foreign exchange during September 1992 European currency crisis). Soros' duel against the
Italian and English central banks would not have been possible without the leverage afforded
by derivatives; he simply would not have had the capital to stay at the table. Id. at 64-65.
Ironically, Soros later warned Congress of the dangers presented by derivatives. See Fromson,
supra note 117, at D14 (quoting Soros in testimony before House Banking Committee:
"[derivatives trading strategies] raise the specter of financial dislocations... [possibly leading
to] catastrophic losses").
227. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining role of derivatives in hedging
strategies).
228. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (describing why liquidity will evaporate
when large numbers of participants attempt to transact hedging readjustments during market
disruptions).
229. Seesupranotes 108-26 and accompanying text (describing some vast market losses). The
14th largest industrial group in Germany required a $1.9 billion bailout from creditors to stave
off default caused by trading losses in the OTC derivatives market). See supra notes 126-33 and
accompanying text (describing trading losses of Metallgesellschaft).
230. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (describing how mass presumption of
liquidity exacerbates market decline).
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ably, information reaching the market regarding a major
23 1
counterparty's default would further exacerbate panicked selling.

23 2
Because derivatives transactions are off-balance sheet activities,

23
how much banks are hedging and betting is difficult to discern.
Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden has argued that "in actual
practice, there may be no way to distinguish between speculative
234
trading activity and hedging strategies."
Despite widespread fears of systemic risk, the OTC derivatives
market has already weathered major counterparty default. Investment
bank Drexel Burnham Lambert collapsed with $30 billion in swaps on
its books,2 35 and the Bank of New England,3 6 the Development
Corporation of New Zealand, and British & Commonwealth Merchant
Bank each defaulted on large swaps positions without causing

231. See Buchan, supra note 208, at 4 (describing severe liquidity and price decline in junk
bond market following rumors that government would close Drexel Burnham Lambert).
232. See Dutt, supra note 189, at D12 (noting companies do not account for derivatives
contracts in normal financial reporting and that such contracts are disclosed in footnotes to
financial statements without meaningful details). One derivatives expert has noted that financial
statements are virtually meaningless for these institutions. Beder Interview, supra note 168.
233. See Thomas L. Hazen, Public Policy: Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-DerivativeSecurities and FinancialFutures and TheirEffect on Underlying CapitalMarkets, 86
Nw. U. L. REv. 987, 1036 (1992) (implying that derivatives market is merely system of legalized
gambling in which wealth is transferred).
234. See Richard C. Breeden, The Use and Control of Derivatives: The Regulator's
Perspective, Remarks at the International Capital Mobility and Financial Derivatives Conference
9 (june 28, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review) (discussing further obstacle
to understanding risks created by lack of clear accounting standard for assets and liabilities in
derivatives positions).
235. See Glasgall &Javetski, supra note 3, at 103 (noting that Federal Reserve officials had to
enter trading desks of both Drexel Burnham Lambert and Bank of New England to unwind
billions of dollars in swaps, and quoting Bank of International Settlements general manager
Alexandre Lamfalussy as stating that Drexel's insolvency "almost upset the whole global
payments system"); cf RobertJ. Schwartz, Remarks at the ISDA's Review of the Group of Thirty
Global Derivatives Study 2-3 (July 29, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review)
(stating that there have been no failures due to derivatives and that when failures have occurred,
derivatives portfolios were "liquidated in an orderly manner").
236. Technically, the Bank of New England's foreign exchange and interest rate contracts
were not covered by Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance, a form of
insurance guaranteed by the government to most bank depositors. Despite the lack of FDIC
insurance, the U.S. government assisted in unwinding most of Bank of New England's $35
billion swaps book before the FDIC took over management of the bank's assets. See Rendleman,
supranote 28, at 30 (arguing that banks can be "too big to fail" and therefore have all debt
obligations guaranteed by government because systemic risk is too great). When the
government guarantees the debt obligations of banking institutions through FDIC depositors
insurance or other means, the cost incurred by the failed portfolio is eventually borne by the
taxpayer. Id. Once the FDIC took over the Bank of New England, the Federal Government
continued actively to ward off systemic risk, transferring the remaining derivatives obligations
to three "healthy" banks. See Jerry Knight, 'Too Big' Policy Eased Loss at Bank of New England,
WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at B1 (describing how U.S. Federal Reserve "orchestrated" Bank of
New England's liquidation throughout entire insolvency process in order to avoid sudden
collapse); Stephen Labaton, U.S. Is Taking Over a Group ofBanks to Head Off a Run, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 1991, at Al, D8 (listing three banks as recipients of remaining obligations of defaulted
Bank of New England's swaps book).
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significant systemic damage. 37 These isolated defaults, however,
occurred in the absence of significant market movement. An
enormous wave of volatility across capital markets, such as simultaneous equity and currency crashes, could cause defaults of unprecedented nature and magnitude. 28
Appraising systemic risk by
confidently pointing to these isolated bankruptcies is akin to
discussing the risk of nuclear holocaust by examining the global
impact of nuclear testing on an isolated Pacific island.
As stated above, derivatives allow users a hedging vehicle of
unprecedented utility.23 9

Tumultuous upheavals across multiple

markets, however, could cause a derivatives-led plunge into the
economic abyss. Counterparty default and its attendant systemic risk
may present one of the greatest challenges the financial system has
ever faced. While perfect clarity of risk cannot be empirically
ascertained, a uniform framework in which to fit these risks is
essential to the continued orderly operation of the global financial
markets.
III.

THE

ENFORCEABILITY OF CLOSE-OUT NETTING IN OTC
DERIVATIVES TRANSACTIONS

A.

The Mechanics of Netting

When legally enforceable, "netting"24 ° refers to the ability to

aggregate reciprocal claims. When one of the parties to a netting
contract is bankrupt, 24 1 enforceable netting results in the reduction

237. SeeMichael Liebowitz, Can the Triple-A Subs Live Up to TheirBilling?,INVESTMENT DEALERS
DIG., Nov. 2, 1992, at 16, 18 (noting that four major bankruptcies created little significant
damage to swaps market despite large defaults); cf U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITiVE BANKS 29 (1991)
("[M]ore must be done directly to reduce the systemic risk involved in bank failures. This in
turn will reduce the number of occasions that uninsured depositors must be protected.").
238. See Hansell, supranote 109, at 51 (describing possibility of huge losses stemming from
derivatives and volatile markets).
239. See supra notes 32-35, 149-56 and accompanying text (explaining hedging and delta
hedging of risk).
240. See GASTINEAU, supranote 7, at 155 (defining "netting agreement" as "contractual offset
of payables against receivables to reduce credit exposure to a counterparty"); WORKING GROUP
ESTABLISHED BY THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN INTERNATIONAL INTERBANK RELATIONS app. B, at 61 (1992). The Group of Ten Working
Group defines "netting" as:
[A]n agreed offsetting of positions or obligations by trading partners or participants
in a system. The netting reduces a larger number of individual positions or obligations
to a smaller number of positions. Netting may take several forms which have varying
degrees of legal enforceability in the event of default of one of the parties.
Id.
241. This Comment uses the terms "bankruptcy" and "trustee" generically to refer to the
regime and administrator across jurisdictions.
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of the nonbreaching party's credit exposure to the bankrupt
counterparty. 42 To illustrate, assume two parties create two open
contracts for the sale of derivative products. As the result of market
movement, party A owes party Z $10 million on one contract, and
party Z owes party A $10 million on the other contract. If party Z
becomes bankrupt, and netting is enforceable, party A has the right
to immediately terminate the agreement, calculate damages on a net
basis, and "set-off' 2 43 the $10 million it has incurred against the $10
million it is owed. 2+4 As a result, the credit exposure of A is zero.
Under some bankruptcy regimes, however, party A may not be able
to enforce termination, netting, and set-off provisions against the
counterparty. 24 5 If netting is not enforceable, party A would have
a gross exposure of $10 million to party Z, and vice versa. Instead of
offsetting this exposure, A's "profitable" contract would be reduced
to an unsecured claim for recovery against a bankrupt party. The
likelihood of A receiving the full benefit of its bargain in this latter
example is tenuous at best. For example, the administrator or
trustee2 46 for the insolvent counterparty may be able to "cherrypick"247 profitable contracts and refuse to honor unprofitable
ones.24 Using the above hypothetical as an illustration, a cherry-

242. See Philip IL Wood, Netting in Commodities and FinancialMarkets, in OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES: CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION 1 (IBC Financial Focus, 1993) [hereinafter Wood,
Netting in Commodities] (on file with The American University Law Review) (listing objects of netting
as reducing credit exposure to counterparty and minimizing transaction costs associated with
maintaining credit lines to cover multiple gross exposures). The reduction in credit exposure
in jurisdictions that enforce netting can be greater than 90%. Id.
243. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 209 (defining "set-off"as "the right of the non-defaulting
party to reduce its debt to the defaulting party by the amount owed it").
244. See Daniel P. Cunningham & William P. Rogers, Jr., Netting is the Law, in ADVANCED
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, at 177, 187 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 746, 1991) [hereinafter Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law]
(explaining solvent party's rights in enforced netting jurisdictions).
245. Daniel P. Cunningham & Paul Michalski, Enforceability Under Various Bankruptcy Laws of
the Automatic Termination and Netting Provisions ofthe ISDA StandardFormAgreements, inADVANCED
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 244, at 227, 235; see GROUP OF THIRTY
REPORT, supra note 4, at 15 (stating that enforceability of netting is still somewhat uncertain in
France); DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 52, at 53 (noting that set-off agreements may not
be available in Germany).
246. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 147 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "bankruptcy trustee" as
someone who administers estate of bankrupt debtor and holds it in trust for benefit of
creditors).
247. See Wood, Netting in Commodities, supra note 242, at 3 (describing "cherry-picking" as
affirmation of contracts favorable to insolvent and rejection of contracts unfavorable to
insolvent); see also GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 57 (stating that "cherry-picking" is practiced
during some bankruptcy proceedings).
248. One such regime, where participants to OTC derivatives transactions could not enforce
termination, netting, or set-off provisions, occurred under the preamended U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. See infra notes 270-309 and accompanying text (describing inequitable incompatibility of
preamended Code with OTC derivatives participants' explicitly stated intentions).
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picking trustee would demand a $10 million payment from A for Zs
profitable contract, and repudiate Z's $10 million debt to A. Thus, a
counterparty who is a creditor to a bankrupt party on a net basis can
become a debtor to the bankrupt party when the transactions are
viewed on a gross basis.249
Before examining the historical and current enforceability of
termination and netting agreements, it is important to note that the
major problem with regard to netting derivatives transactions arises in
the case of the bankruptcy of a participant. 2 0 When one of the
parties is bankrupt, the enforceability of a netting arrangement hinges
on the particular bankruptcy laws and rules governing the transaction
in question.
In the absence of insolvency proceedings,252 a
will be
legally valid contract stipulating that netting arrangements
observed is fully enforceable in accordance with its terms.253
B.

MasterAgreements

Most swaps transaction participants use a single "master agreement"2 4 for all their transactions with a particular counterparty."256
The International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA)
publishes two standardized contracts for documenting interest rate

249. Ernest T. Patrikis & Karen Walraven, The NettingProvisions of the FederalDepositInsurance
CorporationImprovement Act of 1991, FUTURES INT'L L. LETTER, May 1992, at 1, 6.
250. See Stephen R. Greene, The Impact of Derivatives Regulation on Netting (and the
Impact of Netting on Derivative Regulation), Remarks at Risk Magazine/CoATS Software
Symposium 2 (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review) (stating that party
must be in "default" for enforceability questions to arise in otherwise valid netting contract).
Greene defines "default" as "the commencement of liquidation, winding-up, bankruptcy or
similar insolvency proceedings by or against the party." Id.
251. Id. at 3-4.
252. To allow solvent bankrupt parties to escape enforceability of their contracts would
appear inequitable. Judge Posner has stated that "[i]f the bankrupt is solvent the task for the
bankruptcy court is simply to enforce creditors' rights according to the tenor of the contracts
that created those rights." In re Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir.
1986).
253. See Senate Interest Swap Hearings, supra note 51, at 51 (statement of William J. Perlstein,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.) (emphasizing parties' ability to effectuate
termination provisions outside bankruptcy proceedings); Greene, supra note 250, at 2
(articulating enforceability of contractual provisions when parties remain solvent).
254. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 148 (defining "master swap agreement" as
"[c]omprehensive documentation of standard terms and conditions covering all swap
transactions between two counterparties").
255. Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supra note 244, at 186 n.9.
256. See Aaron Pressman, Nationa4 BOND BUYER, June 22, 1993, at 24 (stating that ISDA is
comprised of over 200 swap dealers); Tucker, supra note 29, at n.31 (noting that ISDA was
formed in 1985). Prior to changing its name in 1993 to the International Swaps & Derivatives
Association, Inc., ISDA was known as the International Swap Dealers Association, Inc. Banking
Figures, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Aug. 2, 1993, at 8.
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and currency deals. 7 Participants may choose either the ISDA
Multi-Currency-Cross Border Master Agreement or the ISDA Local
Currency-Single Jurisdiction Master Agreement, depending on the
nature of their counterparty and the transactions contemplated.2
Section 6(a) of each contract explicitly delineates the right to
terminate the agreement prematurely when an "event of default" 9
occurs. 26' This "event of default," as articulated by section 5 (a) (vii),
occurs "any time" a counterparty becomes bankrupt, 261 possibly
resulting in termination of the agreement "immediately. 2 62 The
agreements then provide for the nonbreaching party to calculate
damages263 on a net basis and set-off the collateral the
nonbreaching party is holding against any secured claims under the
2 4
contract. 6
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives trustees the power to assume,
assign, or reject the contracts of the bankrupt party in limited

257. Cunningham & Michalski, supra note 245, at 231. The first contract, entitled "Interest
Rate Swap Agreement," is used for U.S. dollar interest rate swaps and is explicitly governed by
New York law. Id. The second contract, called the "Interest Rate and Currency Exchange
Agreement," is used for international currency and interest rate swaps, and allows parties to
choose between New York and English law. Id.
258. See Memorandum of Law from Cravath, Swaine & Moore for the International Swaps
& Derivatives Association, Inc., Over-the-Counter Derivatives Transactions: Netting Under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, FIRREA and FDICIA 3 n.4 (June 22, 1993) [hereinafter ISDA
Memorandum] (on file with The American University Law Review) (noting that other than
multicurrency and cross-border language in cross-border agreement, two ISDA master
agreements are substantively identical).
259. See International Swap Dealers Association, Inc. Multicurrency-Cross Border Master
Agreement 5-6 (1992) [hereinafter ISDA Master Agreement] (on file with The American University
Law Review) (indicating that "event of default" includes failure to pay or deliver, breach of
agreement, credit support default, misrepresentation, default under specified transaction, cross
default, bankruptcy, and merger without assumption).
260. See id. at 8 (articulating right to prematurely terminate following "termination event,"
known as "early termination").
261. Id. at 5-6. Section 5(a)(vii), in pertinent part, broadly interprets bankruptcy as

occurring when a party.
(1) is dissolved (other than pursuant to a consolidation, amalgamation or merger);
(2) becomes insolvent or is unable to pay its debts as they become due;

(3) makes a general assignment, arrangement or composition with or for the benefit
of its creditors;
(4) institutes or has instituted against it a proceeding seeking a judgement of
insolvency or bankruptcy or any other relief under any bankruptcy or insolvency law
or other similar law affecting creditors' rights, or a petition is presented for its windingup or liquidation;
(6) seeks or becomes subject to the appointment of an administrator, provisional
liquidator, conservator, receiver, trustee, custodian or other similar official for it or for
all or substantially all its assets ....
Id. at 6.
262. See id. at 8 (indicating that immediate termination may occur only upon occurrence of
certain forms of bankruptcy).
263. See Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supra note 244, at 183 (noting damages
are generally calculated according to "'actual direct compensatory damages'").
264. Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supranote 244, at 187.
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circumstances.2 6 5
This practice is known as selective assump6
tion.
A central question regarding the master agreement is
whether all the transactions to be performed under the agreement
are to be viewed as single or multiple transactions.26 7 If the relevant
bankruptcy regime gives trustees the power of selective assumption
and views the transactions of a master agreement as one single
transaction, the trustee must reject or adopt the netted transaction as
a whole. This type of bankruptcy regime eliminates the possibility
that discrete contracts will be cherry-picked by the trustee from within
the agreement. If, however, the bankruptcy laws of the governing
jurisdiction allow selective assumption, and view the master agreement
as a series of individual transactions, the trustee will be allowed to
cherry-pick among the "multiple" contracts. 268 Inexplicably, this
inequitable practice of "cherry-picking" the transactions within a
master agreement had the statutory blessings of the preamended
Bankruptcy Code.269
C.

The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code's Incompatibility with the ISDA's
Master Swap Agreement
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code governs the bankruptcy of most U.S.

265. Under the preamended U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the ability of the trustee to cherry-pick
transactions was facilitated by the assumption and rejection provisions of§ 365(a). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1988) (providing that "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract ... of the debtor"). Whether cherry-picking would have been
enforceable under the preamended Code, however, is uncertain. Bankruptcy law is equitable
in nature, In re Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R, 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986), and the
cherry-picking would have been "subject to the court's approval." 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). While
a court of equity would not likely approve of such a seemingly inequitable practice, the
uncertainty surrounding trustee cherry-picking was of "particular importance to swap
participants." See Tucker, supra note 29, at 607-08 (noting that swap participants were
particularly interested in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (55) (c), which eliminated concern with cherry-picking
raised by § 365(a)).
266. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 592 n.68 (describing role of selective assumption with
respect to executory contracts).
267. See Tucker, supranote 29, at 592 n.68 (raising issue of whether swap master agreement
is "single integrated contract" or "series of unrelated contracts").
268. Senate Interest Swap Hearings, supra note 51, at 12 (statement of Mark C. Brickell,
Chairman, International Swap Dealers Association) (noting that trustee could assume beneficial
contracts and reject others through selective assumption, thus violating express tenants of master
swap agreement).
269. See Philip R. Wood, Netting Under United States Law, in OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES:
CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION, supra note 242, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Wood, Netting UnderU.S. Law]
(on file with The American University Law Review) (explaining that § 365(e) of 1978 U.S.
Bankruptcy Code gives "direct statutory sanction of cherry-picking"). This counterintuitive result
is reinforced by § 362 of the Code, which states that the non-defaulting counterparty cannot setoff, and therefore net, debts it has incurred against those it is owed by the defaulting
counterparty. Id.
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companies that are neither banks nor insurance companies. 7 ° The
preamended Bankruptcy Code's asserted legislative purpose was to
allow governed American companies attempting to restructure their
debt under chapter 11 "a breathing spell and time to work constructively with [their] creditors. ' 7 ' Unfortunately, this admirable theory
presented an unworkable standard in practice with respect to swap
contracts, lending uncertainty to the enforceability of termination,
netting, and set-off in an ISDA master agreement.272 In attempting
to protect the rights of debtors, the preamended Code operated
severely to impair the rights of creditors.
1.

Automatic stay under § 362

Prior to 1990, terminating a derivatives contract in default and
attempting to recover damages, a central feature of the ISDA Master
Agreement,27 3 would have contravened § 362(a) (6) of the Bankruptcy Code.274 Under the provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
when a bankruptcy petition is filed under sections 301, 302, or 303,
§ 362 (a) "operates as a stay, applicable to all entities" 275 against any
attempt to "collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title. 276
Further, § 362 (a) (7) explicitly stays "the setoff of any debt owing to

270. See I1 U.S.C. § 109 (1988) (setting forth who may and may not be debtor under U.S.
bankruptcy law); see also Wood, Netting Under U.S. Law, supranote 269, at 1 (noting that, other
than FDIC-insured and uninsured chartered commercial banks, savings and loan associations,
and insurance companies, most U.S. companies are governed by bankruptcy Code). Those
covered include U.S. bank holding companies, non-bank affiliates of U.S. bank holding
companies, U.S. investment banks, U.S. brokers and dealers, and companies authorized to deal
in exchange-traded futures contracts. Wood, Netting Under U.S. Law, supra note 269, at 1-2.
271. H.R. REP. NO. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6135.
272. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 593 (noting concern of swap participants prior to 1990
amendments). Additionally, the common law provided little clarity. By 1990, the issue of swaps
in bankruptcy had arisen only once in the courts. See Beverly Hills Say. v. Renault Acceptance
B.V., No. C-549-684 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 30, 1985) (issuing preliminary injunction that
prevented Renault from terminating swap contract and selling bankrupt party's collateral to
satisfy debt).
273. See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text (discussing termination and set-off rights
delineated in ISDA Master Agreement).
274. Tucker, supra note 29, at 594.
275. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988). An "entity" is defined by the Bankruptcy Code as any
"person, estate, trust, governmental unit, [or] United States trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)
(1988).
276. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (6) (1988); see 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1
362.01 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1988) (stating that § 362 "provides for a broad stay
of litigation, lien enforcement, and other actions, judicial or otherwise, which would affect or
interfere with property of the estate, property of the debtor, or property in the custody of the
estate").
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the debtor that arose before the commencement" of bankruptcy
proceedings. 2 "
The legislative history of § 362 explains Congress' admirable intent
to create in the automatic stay "one of the fundamental debtor
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 278 The "protection"
so explicitly sought for debtors, however, would have had an
inequitable impact on the rights of creditors.279 Congress opined
that the automatic stay would not hinder creditors' rights. 280 The
stay merely prevents enforcement "pending an orderly examination
of the debtor's and creditors' rights."28 1 Yet, capital markets are
dynamic by nature.28 2 High volatility can dramatically change the
price, yield, or return of underlying securities in short periods of
time.283 As a practical matter, delaying the ability to terminate an
OTC derivatives contract can result in catastrophic economic losses to
28 4
the nonbreaching party from adverse market movements.
For example, assume the counterparty to Merrill Lynch's ill-fated,
mortgage-backed securities position in 19872
had gone into
bankruptcy prior to the volatile market movement that occurred.28 6
The automatic stay would have operated to enjoin 287 Merrill Lynch
from terminating the agreement with the defaulting counterparty,
effectively granting the debtor the "breathing spell from his creditors '288 that Congress envisioned. The passage of time for the
"orderly examination of the debtor's and creditor's rights," however,
would have resulted in a sharp market movement away from Merrill

277. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1988).
278. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. 5787,
5840.

279. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 583 n.13 (claiming that risk of damages to creditors are
substantial in relation to benefits received by debtors).
280. H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6298.
281. Id.
282. See Senate Interest Swap Hearings, supra note 51, at 25 (statement of Mark C. Brickell,
Chairman, International Swap Dealers Association) (commenting that currency exchange and
interest rate markets tend to fluctuate rapidly).
283. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 245 (defining volatility).
284. Seesupranotes110-25 and accompanying text (discussing speed and magnitude ofactual
losses in OTC derivatives markets).
285. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing how Merrill Lynch lost $377
million in mortgage-backed securities position in less than one month in 1987).
286. The actual cause of Merrill Lynch's vast losses were adverse movements in interest rates,
LEWIS, supra note 110, at 145, wholly unrelated to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. As
Merrill Lynch can attest, adverse market movements may destroy vast amounts of capital
overnight. The speed and size of the losses in this example evidence the onerous economic
burden that could face a creditor enjoined from action by the automatic stay.
287. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6300 (describing stay as "essentially an injunction").

288.

Id. at 174, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6135.
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2 °
Lynch's position. 289 Despite legislative intent to the contrary,
an injunction that operates to force unlimited losses on nonbreaching
creditors does indeed infringe upon "the right of creditors.""1

2.

The inability to terminate on condition of bankruptcy under § 365(e)

The ISDA Master Agreement's stated "Right to Terminate Following
Event of Default" 2 2 directly contravened § 365(e) 293 of the
preamended Bankruptcy Code. Under the standard ISDA contract,
"events of default" explicitly include the broadly interpreted incident
of "bankruptcy." 4 Parties to a standard derivatives contract therefore manifestly expressed their intent that a right of termination
occur should one of the parties become bankrupt. Section 365 (e) (1),
however, clearly stated in pertinent part that "[n]otwithstanding a
provision in an executory contract... an executory contract... may
not be terminated or modified ... solely because of a provision in

such contract or lease that is conditioned on the insolvency or
financial

condition

of

the

debtor."29 5

Consequently,

the

289. Ordinarily, Merrill Lynch would be able to hedge against the losses incurred during the
pendency of the automatic stay. In a severe market disruption, however, where everyone is
selling and no one is buying, hedging may be an impossibility. See supra note 155 and
accompanying text (discussing inability to effectuate hedging in illiquid market).
290. See supranote 281 and accompanying text (stating that § 362 would not affect creditors'
rights).
291. H.R. REP. No.595,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6298. Relief from an otherwise onerous automatic stay is articulated in § 362(d)-(f). The
section relevant to derivatives transactions, § 362(f), grants creditors the right to seek ex parte
relief from the stay if the relief is "necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an
entity." 11 U.S.C. § 362(f) (1988). The burden of proving "irreparable damage" is on the
creditor seeking the relief. § 362(g)(1). Due to the dynamic nature of short-term interest rates,
however, proving "irreparable harm" based on adverse movements would be an unreliable
exception to the stay. Tucker, supra note 29, at 598 n.101. The practical impact of this lack of
certainty would be the erection of further barriers to lower credit participation in OTC
derivatives transactions. See supra notes 182, 187-91 and accompanying text (discussing
increasing low-credit preclusion from OTC markets because of uncertainty over counterparty
credit risk). Narrow participation in markets results in reduced liquidity, hampering economic
efficiency. See Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on Dealing with
Market Manipulation,8 YALEJ. ON REG. 391, 399 (1991) (observing that if market participation
decreases, "liquidity which is an essential element for market efficiency would be greatly
reduced").
292. ISDA Master Agreement, supranote 259, § 6(a), at 8.
293. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1988).
294. ISDA Master Agreement, supranote 259, § 5(a)(vii), at 6.
295. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1) (A). Section 365 further prohibited the termination of an
executory contract because of "the commencement of a case under [the Bankruptcy Code]" or
"the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a custodian
before such commencement." Id. § 365(e) (1) (B)-(C). In contrast, § 5(a) (vii) (4) of the ISDA
Master Agreement explicitly allows for termination of the executory contract when a
counterparty "institutes or has instituted against it a proceeding seeking a judgment of
insolvency or bankruptcy law or any other relief under any bankruptcy or insolvency law." ISDA
Master Agreement, supranote 259, § 5(a) (vii) (4), at 6. The ISDA Master Agreement further
contravened the preamended Bankruptcy Code by allowing termination when a counterparty
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nonbreaching party would have been denied from exercising its
contractual right to terminate the agreement prematurely because of
to risk
counterparty bankruptcy, resulting in a vastly greater exposure
29 6
than that for which the nonbreaching party had bargained.
3.

Section 365(a) and the uncertainty regardingassumption and
rejection by the trustee

Section 365(a) of the preamended Bankruptcy Code provides that
"the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract . . . of the debtor."29 7 While this power to
assume or reject applies exclusively to "executory contract[s]," the
Bankruptcy Code drafters failed to define precisely what constituted
an executory contract. The Bankruptcy Code's legislative history
notes that an executory contract "generally includes contracts on
298
which performance remains due to some extent on both sides."
Any derivative product that involves an exchange of future payments
between counterparties meets the requirements of "executory
contract" for purposes of § 365 because the performance of making
those payments "remains due" for both sides. As a result, parties to
these transactions under the preamended Bankruptcy Code faced
uncertainty regarding whether their contracts would be assumed or
rejected by a trustee in the event of a counterparty bankruptcy.2
"seeks or becomes subject to the appointment of an administrator, provisional liquidator,
conservator, receiver, trustee, custodian or other similar official." Id. § 5(a)(vii)(6), at 6.
Because the preamended Bankruptcy Code ensured its prohibition against termination due to
bankruptcy "[n]otwithstanding" any contractual provisions to the contrary, termination rights
in the Master Agreement would have been unenforceable.
296. Tucker, supranote 29, at 600.
297. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
298. H.R REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978), repintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5840; see also BLAcK'S LAW DICIONARY, 570 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "executory contract7 as
'contract that has not as yet been fully completed or performed").
299. See Senate Interest Swap Hearings,supra note 51, at 52 (statement of William J. Perlstein,
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.) (noting that one of most pressing concerns
among swaps participants prior to amendments was possibility that trustee could cherry-pick
contracts); Tucker, supra note 29, at 600 (discussing "valid concerns" of swaps participants
regarding assumption and rejection of swaps contracts under preamended § 365). Section
365(c) (2) limits the ability of the trustee to assume or reject executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. §
365(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (stating that "trustee may not assume or assign any executory
contract... [if] such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor"). In the most common form of
an OTC derivative transaction, the swap agreement, "financing" is not provided by either party.
Tucker, supranote 29, at 601. Rather, parties simply exchange streams of interest payments.
Id. Neither is any "loan" or "debt financing" provided. See id. (noting that parties do not extend
credit). Thus, the most common form of OTC derivative would clearly not have satisfied the
exemption from assumption and rejection provided by § 365(c) (2). SeeDaniel P. Cunningham
& William P. Rogers, Jr., The Status of Swap Agreements in Bankruptcy, in INTEREST RATE AND
CURRENCY SWAPS 1989, at 203, 219 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 638,
1989) (stating that Congress had in mind only normal financing transactions and not other
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The criteria allowing a trustee to reject an executory contract may
be easily met by using "business judgement.""
The "business
judgement" test "merely requires a showing by the Trustee or Debtorin-Possession that rejection of the contract will be likely to benefit the
estate." a ' Under the preamended Bankruptcy Code, when a trustee
met this simple test, the trustee was granted an extensive length of
time to determine whether to assume or reject the executory contracts
of the defaulting party. 02 Because the nondefaulting party was
enjoined from terminating the contract during this period under the
automatic stay provision," the contract was subject to adverse
market movements that occurred during the pendency of stay.304
Thus, the delays of the assumption and rejection period, in conjunction with the inability of the nonbreaching party to terminate the
contract in accordance with its terms, levied the threat of substantial
economic harm on the nonbreaching party under the preamended
Bankruptcy Code.
The issue of whether contracts contained within an ISDA Master
Agreement constitute a single agreement or a series of discrete
agreements has never been determined by a U.S. court.0 5 Under
§ 365(a) of the preamended Bankruptcy Code, if a trustee could
convince a bankruptcy court that the agreements contained in the
Master Agreement were discrete contracts, the trustee would have
been able to cherry-pick the contracts favorable to the bankrupt party
and reject the contracts on which the bankrupt was a net payor.30 6
Given the equitable nature and broad discretion of bankruptcy

commercial arrangements that provide for payments to be made over time). Prior to the 1990
amendments, the uncertainty caused by the Bankruptcy Code regarding the potential ability of
trustees to assume or reject contracts created inefficiencies in the derivatives markets. Tucker,
supranote 29, at 602 n.1 19.
300. See Tucker, supranote 29, at 603 n.124 (discussing "business judgement" test and "loss
or detriment to the estate" test as two schools of thought for determining whether trustee can
reject executory contract under § 365).
301. In reW. & L. Assocs., 71 B.R 962, 966 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
302. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1) (1988) (providing that in chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee has
60 days to make determination whether to assume or reject executory contract following order
for relief). Section 365(d) (2) states that, in cases under chapters 9, 11, 12, or 13 of the Code,
the court may establish a specific period of time for determining whether to assume or reject
the contracts. Id. § 365(d) (2).
303. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
304. See supratext accompanying note 284 (discussing onerous possibility of adverse market
movement during pendency of stay under preamended Bankruptcy Code).
305. Tucker, supra note 29, at 606.
306. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (explaining that cherry-picking will result if
selective assumption is allowed and master agreement is regarded as several individual
transactions).
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courts,"°7 and notwithstanding the lack of binding precedent,'
such an inequitable outcome probably would not occur. The vast
amounts of money at stake in OTC derivatives transactions, however,
made the small possibility of performing on losing contracts and
losing the benefit of winning contracts unpalatable to dealers and
end-users. When this uncertainty was exacerbated by the onerous
ramifications of preamended Code §§ 365 and 362, fears over credit
and systemic risks heightened the inefficiencies of the OTC derivatives
39
market.
D.
1.

The 1990 Amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code

Amended definition of swap agreement and participant: a remedy to
chenry-picking uncertainties

On June 25, 1990, Congress enacted an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code that expressly addressed swap transactions. 3 0 In1
3
the amendments, Congress broadly defined "swap agreement." '

307. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (articulating broad power of bankruptcy courts); Bank of
Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (emphasizing importance of equity in bankruptcy
courts); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting "overriding
consideration" of equity by bankruptcy courts).
308. SeeJohn P. Behof, Reducing CreditRisk in Over-the-CounterDerivatives, FED. RES, BANK OF
CHICAGO ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 21, 26 (noting low number of bankrupt
derivative firms which could have brought suit).
309. One notable inefficiency was the exclusion of lower credit counterparties from the
market. See H.R. REP. NO. 484, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
223, 223-26 (discussing concerns about impact of bankruptcy on creditors in swap transactions);
Senate Interest Swap Hearings,supranote 51, at 124 (statement ofJohnJ.Jerome, Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy, P.C.) (noting that increased certainty of bankruptcy provisions will work to
eliminate OTC derivatives market's preclusion of parties with low credit ratings). Parties with
lower credit ratings have been excluded from participation in this market because of the
increasing credit wariness among OTC market participants. See Farrand, supra note 190 (noting
that broker-dealers are paying greater attention to credit ratings of OTC-derivatives
counterparties); supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (describing prevalent attitude of
credit risk-averseness in OTC derivatives market participants as a barrier to entry for lower credit
entities because of unwillingness of current participants to risk entering agreements with them).
310. See Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, 104 Stat. 267; see also Cunningham &
Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supra note 244, at 184 (listing principal features of amendment as
express exemption from automatic stay under § 362, express recognition that parties entitled
to exercise contractual rights such as termination and close-out netting, and express protection
for transfers under swaps agreement against trustee's power to avoid preferential payments).
311. 11 U.S.C. § 101(55) (Supp. IV 1992). Under the amended § 101, a "swap agreement"
encompasses the following:
(A) an agreement (including terms and conditions incorporated by reference therein)
which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, forward rate agreement, commodity swap,
interest rate option, forward foreign exchange agreement, rate cap agreement, rate
floor agreement, rate collar agreement, currency swap agreement, cross-currency rate
swap agreement, currency option, any other similar agreement (including any option
to enter into any of the foregoing);
(B) any combination of the foregoing ....
Id. § 101 (55).
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With the addition of "any other similar agreement" 12 to the definition, the term "swap agreement" covers all existing swap transactions,
as well as present and future transactions that are not specifically
delineated in the amendment but have fundamental similarities to
those enumerated.1 3
The main purpose of § 101 (55) (C), a key provision in the 1990
amendments, is to provide certainty that the trustee of a bankrupt
party will not be able to cherry-pick profitable swaps transactions.1 4
This goal is accomplished by providing that a "master agreement for
any of the foregoing [delineated swap transactions] together with all
supplements" constitutes a swap agreement. 3 5
This language
explicitly states that multiple swap agreements contained within a
"master agreement" will be viewed as a single "swap agreement" by the
Bankruptcy Code. By viewing a master agreement as a single
transaction,1 ' Congress prevented trustees from assuming discrete
contracts within the agreement and rejecting others. Thus, §
101(55) (C) eliminates concerns over cherry-picking for the most
common form of OTC derivatives.
2.

The Code's amendment of the automatic stay and the right to
terminate and exercise netting provisions
Amended § 362(b)(14) 311 provides an exemption for swap agree-

312. Id. § 101 (55) (A).
313. Cunningham & Rogers, Nettingls the Law, supra note 244, at 185; cf H.R. REP. No. 484,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 226 (stating that definition
of swap agreement includes various "interest rate and foreign exchange swaps agreements," as
well as "options to enter into such agreements").
314. See Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supra note 244, at 185 (asserting that
amended § 101 (55) (C), in conjunction with § 560 of Bankruptcy Code, eliminates ability of any
trustee to cherry-pick profitable swap transactions); Tucker, supranote 29, at 607-08 (describing
importance of cherry-picking concerns prior to amendments, and noting that amendments have
effectively "settled" cherry-picking concerns); cf H.R. REP. No. 484, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1,3
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 225 (explaining that purpose of 1990 amendment
is to resolve uncertainties that have caused concern among swap participants, such as ability of
debtor to "cherry pick").
315. 11 U.S.C. § 101(55)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
316. Even prior to the 1990 Bankruptcy Code amendments, excellent arguments were
advanced that the intent of the parties to a master agreement and the equitable nature of
bankruptcy law were sufficient to ensure that a master agreement constitutes a single executory
contract. See, e.g., Memorandum by Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; Sullivan & Cromwell; Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz; and White & Case for the Bank of England and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System entitled "The Status of Swap Agreements Under Section 365 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code" 26-33 (June 1, 1987) (on file with The American University Law
Review). Had this argument been successfully advanced in an actual bankruptcy proceeding, the
trustee would not have been able to cherry-pick profitable transactions and reject losing
transactions.
317. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (14) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 362(b) (14) provides in pertinent part:
(b) The filing of a petition.., does not operate as a stay... under subsection (a) of
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ments from the scope of the automatic stay articulated in §
362(a)31 1 of the Bankruptcy Code. 3 9 The exemption permits
swaps participants to setoff any mutual obligations arising within a
master agreement. 320 The exemption also allows any of the debtor's
"cash, securities, or other property"3 2 being held in a collateral or
margin account to be applied towards satisfaction of the debt,
regardless of the financial condition of the debtor.2 2 As a result of
this amendment, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly allows netting of
payment amounts for outstanding swaps, even when the obligations
23
being netted arose after one of the parties filed for bankruptcy.
Section 106 of the amending legislation

24

added § 560, which

provides for the "Contractual Right to Terminate a Swap Agreement. 3 25 The language of § 560, when viewed in conjunction with
§ 362(b), makes the termination, setoff, and netting provisions of an

this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and claim under
or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against
the debtor for any payment due from the debtor under or in connection with any swap
agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or
in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property
of the debtor held by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle
any swap agreement.
Id. § 362(b) (14).
318. Section 362(a) "operates as a stay [against] the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
319. Prior to any legislative changes to the U.S. bankruptcy regime, OTC derivatives
participants attempted to avoid onerous provisions by including in their master agreement: (1)
an extremely broad definition of "event of default," allowing termination of an agreement at the
first onset of financial troubles, thus avoiding the restrictions in place once a counterparty
actually filed for bankruptcy; (2) an automatic termination of the agreement in the event of
default; and (3) backdating the termination to a date prior to the bankruptcy filing. Wood,
Netting Under U.S. Law, supra note 269, at 3. While these efforts were never tested in court, the
potential success of such obvious circumventions was questionable at best. See id. at 4 (noting
that U.S. bankruptcy lawyers doubted effectiveness of avoidance methods employed).
320. Cunningham & Rogers, NettingIs the Law, supra note 244, at 185. A master agreement
is considered a "swap agreement" under U.S. bankruptcy laws. Id. at 186 n.9.
321. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (14) (Supp. IV 1992).
322. See Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law, supra note 244, at 185 (describing
implications of exemption to automatic stay).
323. Tucker, supranote 29, at 609.
324. Act ofJune 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, § 106, 104 Stat. 267, 268.
325. 11 U.S.C. § 560 (Supp. IV 1992) provides:
The exercise of any contractual right of any swap participant to cause the termination
of a swap agreement because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365(e) (1)
of this title or to offset or net out any termination values or payment amounts arising
under or in connection with any swap agreement shall not be stayed, avoided, or
otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or
administrative agency in any proceeding under this title. As used in this section, the
term 'contractual right' includes a right, whether or not evidenced in writing, arising
under common law, under law merchant, or by reason of normal business practice.

Id. § 560.

1994]

OTC DERIVATIVES

1071

ISDA Master Agreement fully enforceable. 26 A primary impact of
this provision is to eliminate the applicability of § 365(e) to "swap
agreements, "327 which would otherwise proscribe a nondefaulting
party from terminating an agreement because of counterparty
3 28

bankruptcy.

E. FIRREA's Reduction of Inequitable FDICPowers
On August 9, 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).329 In
addition to extending the scope of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) to almost all banks and savings institutions in the
United States, 3 ° FIRREA significantly curtailed the powers of the
FDIC to act as receiver 3 ' or conservator3 32 for a bankrupt financial institution.333
In granting the FDIC the power to assume, assign, or reject
contracts unfavorable to the debtor when the FDIC acts in the role of

326. Id. § 560.
327. See Tucker, supra note 29, at 613.
328. Cunningham & Rogers, NettingIsthe Law, supra note 244, at 186. Although neither the
Bankruptcy Code amendments nor the legislative history speaks on the matter, Congress likely
intended the amendments to apply retroactively to all bankruptcy cases filed subsequent to the
enactment of the amendments. Id. This assumption is validated by the equitable nature of the
Bankruptcy Code. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (discussing significance of equity
principles to bankruptcy courts). Because contracts contained in a master agreement constitute
a single transaction under the amended Bankruptcy Code, failing to apply the amendments
retroactively would deny Bankruptcy Code protections to all swap agreements entered into prior
to 1990. Failure to apply the amendments retroactively would thus render Bankruptcy Code
protections "a triviality," which has been held intolerable. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bullington,
878 F.2d 354, 360 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that in absence of explicit congressional intent,
implicit intent exists to apply Bankruptcy Code retroactively).
329. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 note (Supp. IV
1992)).
330. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c) (Supp. IV 1992) (defining those depository institutions covered
under FDIC following passage of FIRREA); see also Cunningham & Rogers, Netting Is the Law,
supra note 244, at 179-80 (summarizing application of FIRREA).
331. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (8) (A) (i) (Supp. IV 1992). A receivership is an equitable remedy
in which property is placed under the control of a receiver who manages the property for the
benefit of the insolvent's creditors. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
bankruptcy proceeding of receivership).
332. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (8) (E) (i). A conservator is a court-appointed custodian of property
that belongs to a party determined by the court to be unable to properly manage the property.
UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 1-201 (6), 5-401 (c) (1987). A conservator may be either a public or private
agency rather than an individual. See id. § 5-409(a) (defining who may be appointed as
"conservator").
333. See ISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 9 (describing how FIRREA "revised the
powers of the FDIC as the receiver or conservator for an insolvent financial institution").
Despite this extension, FIRREA would not apply to an unchartered or non-federally insured
bank or savings institution. Id. at 9 n.16. The provisions of FIRREA regarding receivership and
conservatorship would also not apply to the bankruptcy ofa U.S. branch ofa non-U.S. bank that
did not have federal depositors' insurance. Id.
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gives the FDIC virtually identi-

cal powers as a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. 35 FIRREA,
however, prevents the FDIC from exercising its powers of selective
assumption 33 6 with respect to agreements that meet the definition
of "qualified financial contracts" (QFCs).3" The test for whether a
contract is covered by FIRREA is primarily product-specific, although
there is also a counterparty inquiry.33 8 Because "swap agreements,"
"options," and "forwards" are specifically enumerated as qualified
financial contracts,339 all OTC derivatives transactions clearly meet
the product requirement for protection under FIRREA. Assuming
that a financial entity participating in an OTC derivatives transaction
is an FDIC-insured institution, such a party would meet the
counterparty requirement as well.
1.

4°

Enforceability of netting and termination provisions under FIRREA

FIRREA generally allows parties to exercise contractual rights to

334. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(e) (8) (E), (e) (9), (e) (12) (Supp. IV 1992); see also ISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 10 (noting similarities between trustee's power under Bankruptcy Code
and FDIC's power under FDIA to "repudiate burdensome contracts, to enforce contracts, and
to assign contracts to another party").
335. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988).
336. See supranote 265 and accompanying text (defining and discussing inequitable nature
of "selective assumption").
337. Section 1821(e) (8) (D) (i) defines a "qualified financial contract" as any "securities
contract, commodity contract, forward contract, repurchase agreement, [and] swap agreement."
12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (8) (D) (i). FIRREA includes the following instruments in its definition of
"swap agreement":
Rate swap agreements, basis swaps, commodity swaps, forward rate agreements, interest
rate futures, interest rate options purchased, forward foreign exchange agreements,
rate cap, floor and collar agreements, currency swap agreements, cross-currency rate
swap agreements, currency futures, currency options purchased, or any other similar
agreements and any options on the foregoing.
Id. § 1821 (e) (8) (D) (vi). As noted in Part I of this Comment, all derivative products are based
on the principal of forwards and options. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text
(describing genesis of derivatives and noting that all derivatives transactions are comprised of
or related to forwards and options). If all derivative products are truly based on either forwards
or options, then FIRREA's expansive definition of QFC, inclusive of both forwards and options,
would clearly cover all derivatives transactions. See ISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 20
(stating that "[n]on-[e]numerated [t]ransactions are likely to fall within the definition of
'forward contract' or 'securities contract'").
338. FIRREA requires a "product" that is a qualified financial contract and a counterparty
that is federally chartered or federally insured. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (8) (D) (i) (Supp. IV 1992);
see also ISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 9 n.16 (explaining that "bank[s] or savings
institution[s] that [are] neither federally chartered nor federally insured" will not receive
coverage under FIRREA).
339. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (8) (D) (i), (vi).
340. FIRREA refers to "insured depository institution" 24 times, emphasizing that the
qualified financial contracts of all FDIC insured depository institutions will be covered. Id. §
1821 (e) (8) (A) (i) (providing that "no person shall be stayed or prohibited from exercising..
. any right to cause the termination or liquidation of any qualified financial contract with an
insured depository institution").
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terminate an agreement due to the bankruptcy of one of the
parties. 4 '
FIRREA imposes a limitation on early termination,
however, if the termination is conditioned "solely" 342 on the
appointment of the conservator.3 43 Thus, in the case of a receivership, the nondefaulting party may exercise all contractual termination
rights enumerated in a qualified financial contract.344 In the case
of a conservatorship, a party to a qualified financial contract may
exercise any contractual right to terminate other than one
that is
345
conservator.
the
of
appointment
the
on
solely
conditioned
Under FIRREA, the netting provisions of qualified financial contract
participants are enforceable in accordance with their terms. 46
Section 1821(e) (8) (A) (iii) ensures this result by unambiguously
providing for the "offset or net out [of] any termination value,
payment amount, or other transfer obligation arising under or in
connection with [one] or more [qualified financial] contracts." 47
2.

Rejection of cherry-picking underFIRREA

FIRREA affords participants to qualified financial contracts
protection from cherry-picking. This is accomplished through a
provision proscribing selective assumption of qualified financial
contracts by receivers or conservators in any "transfer" of financial
assets. 348 Indeed, when a nondefaulting counterparty's qualified
financial contracts are transferred by the conservator or receiver, they
must either all be transferred as one to a single depository institution

341. Id. § 1821 (e) (8) (A). For example, in the case of a receivership, a party to a qualified
financial contract mar. (i) exercise any contractual right to terminate or liquidate a qualified
financial contract as a result of the appointment of the receiver;, (ii) exercise "any right under
any security arrangement relating to any [qualified financial] contract"; and (iii) exercise "any
right to offset or net out any termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation
arising under or in connection with [one] or more [qualified financial contracts]." Id. §
1821(e)(8)(A).
342. Id. § 1821 (e) (12).
343. Id. § 1821 (e) (8) (E) (stating that there shall be no stays on right of termination except
where subject to § 1821 (e) (12)).
344. Id. § 1821(e) (8) (A) (noting no limitation on receiver in case of termination).
345. Id. §§ 1821 (e) (8) (E), (e) (12) (indicating that conservators are subject to provisions of
subsection (e) (12)); see also ISDA Memorandum, supranote 258, at 9 n.18 (noting that "ifthere
exists a contractual right to terminate based on the appointment of a conservator and some
other event of default, then a party would be able to terminate a qualified financial contract
upon the occurrence of such other event notwithstanding the appointment of the conservator").
346. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (8) (A) (iii) (Supp. IV 1992); see also Cunningham & Rogers, Netting
Is the Law, supranote 244, at 182 n.3 (asserting that FIRREA does not address validity of early
termination payment calculations, but merely provides for enforceability of otherwise legally
valid netting provisions).
347. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (e) (8) (A) (iii).
348. Id. § 1821(e) (9).
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or not transferred at all.3 49 Thus, FIRREA utilizes the same method
as the Bankruptcy Code.. to eliminate the potential for cherrypicking. By treating qualified financial contracts within a master
agreement as "1 swap agreement""' rather than as a series of
discrete agreements, there is no risk of selective repudiation by the
trustee when FIRREA governs the transaction.
Enforceability of Netting Provisions Under the FederalDepositors
Insurance CorporationImprovement Act of 1991
By enacting the Federal Depositors Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) on December 19, 1991,2
Congress validated contractual netting provisions3 53 between financial institution[s] under a netting contract, "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" 354 and notwithstanding any "stay, injunction,
avoidance, moratorium or similar proceeding or order, whether issued
or granted by a court, administrative agency, or otherwise."35 5 An
ISDA master agreement falls under FDIC's definition of a "netting
F

349. FIRREA states in pertinent part that in the instance of "making any transfer of assets
or liabilities of a depository institution in default which includes any qualified financial contract,
the conservator or receiver for such depository institution shall either... transfer [all QFC's]
to 1 depository institution . . . [or] transfer none of the financial contracts." Id. §
1821(e) (9) (A)-(B); see id. § 1821(e) (8)(D) (vii) (providing that "any master agreement . . .
together with all supplements to such master agreement shall be treated as 1 swap agreement").
350. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(55)(C) (Supp. IV 1992); Patrikis & Walraven, supra note 249, at 1
(stating that both Bankruptcy Code and FIRREA validate close-out provisions of certain types
of contracts). The amended Bankruptcy Code's treatment of master agreements as a single
agreement is viewed as an efficient method to eliminate the risk of trustee cherry-picking.
Patrikis & Walraven, supra note 249, at 1.
351. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (8) (D) (vii) (Supp. IV 1992).
352. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (Supp. IV

1992)).
353. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the federal agency responsible for the
administration of FDICIA, has observed that "[n] etting contracts between financial institutions
in the United States generally are valid under the netting provisions of... FDICIA." 57 Fed.
Reg. 31,974, 31,980 (1992).
354. Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code's language, "notwithstanding any other provision of
law," using ordinary meaning, FDICIA appears to preempt all contrary federal and state laws.
See ISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 13 n.38 (asserting that "FDICIA shields netting
contracts from the effect of judicial stays and orders"). Examples of such preempted stays or
orders include a Securities Investor Protection Corporation's (SIPC) stay or order under 11
U.S.C § 742 (1988), and a Securities and Exchange Commission's stay or order. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 4405 (Supp. IV 1992) (indicating that no stay or order will "delay application of otherwise
enforceable netting contracts"). In the absence of preemptive language, stays or orders
authorized by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 could bar the liquidation of netting
contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b) (2) (4) (B) (1988). Similarly, the SEC could seek an order
preventing liquidation of a securities contract. Id. § 78o(b)(1).
355. 12 U.S.C. § 4405.
356. See ISDA Master Agreement, supra note 259, § 6(e) (iv), at 10 (articulating parties'
agreement to estimate recoverable present or future payments).
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contract" 35 7 because the agreement expressly anticipates "present or
future payment obligations."3 58 Thus, the benefits of contractual
netting agreements will be legally binding on all parties covered by
FDICIA, even in the event of bankruptcy.
Congress enacted FDICIA in part to reduce systemic risk by
ensuring that netting provisions would be upheld. 59 While this goal
mirrors that of FIRREA and the Bankruptcy Code amendments, both
FIRREA and the Bankruptcy Code use a product-specific approach to
validating netting. 36° In contrast, FDICIA affords protection to
netting arrangements based on the character of the counterparty.361
This approach is more sensible, as it eliminates the need to constantly
update the law to keep pace with innovative derivative products.3 62
Section 4402 (9) of FDICIA defines "financial institution" to include
"a broker or dealer,36 3 a depository institution,3 4 a futures com-

357. 12 U.S.C. § 4402(14) (Supp. IV 1992). Section 4402(14) provides in pertinent part that
a "netting contract" is a contract between two or more financial institutions that "is governed
by the laws of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of any State, and ...
provides for netting present or future payment obligations or payment entitlements (including
liquidation or close-out values relating to the obligations or entitlements) among the parties to
the agreement." Id.
358. Id.
359. See id. § 4401 (noting that netting procedures will only be effective "if they are
recognized as valid and legally binding"); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE

FtNANcIAL SYSTEM 29 (1991) (articulating that underlying reason for enacting FDICIA was need
"to reduce the systemic risk involved in bank failures, [and that such reduction would] ...
reduce the number of occasions that uninsured depositors must be protected"); see also Wood,
Netting in Commodities, supra note 242, at 1 (stating that reduction in credit exposure in
jurisdictions that enforce netting can be greater than 90%).
360. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(55) (Supp. IV 1992) (listing those products in Bankruptcy Code
considered swap agreements).
361. 12 U.S.C. § 4402(14) (stating that netting contract is "agreement between 2 or more
financial institutions").
362. See Patrikis & Walraven, supranote 249, at 1-2 (noting that FDICIA's "netting provisions
obviate the need to amend the law each time financial rocket scientists develop new products").
363. See 12 U.S.C. § 4402 (1) (A) (defining "broker or dealer" to mean "any company that
is registered or licensed under Federal or State law to engage in the business of brokering,
underwriting, or dealing in securities in the United States"). In addition, § 4402 (1) (B) includes
any affiliate of a registered broker or dealer, as determined by the Board and to the extent that
it does not contravene the Act. Id. § 4402(1) (B).
364. Id. § 4402(6); see alsoISDA Memorandum, supra note 258, at 12 (stating that "depository
institution" includes "national and state banks, credit unions, thrift institutions, U.S. branches
or agencies of foreign banks, or Edge Act corporations"). Section 4402(6) defines depository
institution:
(A) a depository institution as defined in section 19(b) (1) (A) of the Federal Reserve
Act [12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A)] ... ;
(B) a branch or agency as defined in section 1 (b) of the International Banking Act of
1978 [12 U.S.C. § 3101];
(C) a corporation chartered under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act [12 U.S.C.
§ 611 et seq.]; or
(D) a corporation having an agreement or undertaking with the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System....
Id. § 4402(6).
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mission merchant,"' or any other institution as determined by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."" Several other
defined terms refer to the term "financial institution," which is the
term that provides limitations on substantive portions of the netting
Ernest Patrikis, General Counsel of the Federal
provisions. 67
Reserve Bank of New York, has written that the term "financial
institution" encompasses most of the important participants in the
OTC derivatives market, and if needed, the definition may be
expanded by the Board to include other institutions under the netting
provisions. 68
Because the Act allows "any other institution [to be covered by
FDICIA] as determined by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System,"369 the Board is authorized to expand the scope of
"financial institution." The Federal Reserve Board recognized the
urgent need for uniform enforceability of netting provisions. In May
1993, the Board issued a proposal37 0 to expand the enforceability of
netting contracts by expanding the scope of "financial institution."3 71 This proposal led to the promulgation of a rule 72that
significantly broadened the definition of "financial institution."
G.

The FinalPiece of the U.S. Bankruptcy Regime: The FederalReserve
Board of Governors' New Definition of 'TinancialInstitution"

In enacting a new definition of FDICIA's "financial institution," the
Board acknowledged the need to increase efficiency and lower the
present risk in the financial markets3 73 through wider enforceability

365. 12 U.S.C. § 4402(10). A "futures commission merchant" is a "company that is registered
or licensed under Federal law to engage in the business of selling futures and options in
commodities." Id.
366. Id. § 4402(6)(D).
367. Patrikis & Walraven, supranote 249, at 3 (noting that term "financial institution" "is
probably most significant term with respect to the scope of the netting provisions" within
FDICIA).
368. Patrikas & Walraven, supra note 249, at 3.
369. 12 U.S.C. § 4402 (9).
370. 58 Fed. Reg. 29,149, 29,151 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 231.1) (proposed
May 19, 1993).
371. 58 Fed. Reg. 29,151. The stated purpose of this provision is to "allow more financial
market participants to avail themselves of the netting provisions set forth [in FDICIA]." Id.
372. Reg. EE, 59 Fed. Reg. 4784 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231).
373. It is a widely held view that netting contributes to the reduction of systemic risk. See
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE
CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GROUP OF 10 COUNTRIES pt. B, at 10 (1990) [hereinafter BIS NETTING
" [e ]f
fective reductions in actual exposures depend upon the legal
SCHEMES REPORT] (noting that

soundness of a netting scheme"); GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 22 (stating that
"[b]y reducing settlement risk as well as credit exposures, netting contributes to the reduction
of systemic risk"); Wood, supra note 242, at 1 (describing reduction in counterparty credit risk

of up to 90% where netting is legally enforceable); see alsosupra notes 240-49 and accompanying
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of netting provisions.3 74 To achieve this stated goal, the Board
created broad qualitative and quantitative tests for determining
qualification as a "financial institution."
Section 231.3(a) states that under the first, qualitative prong, a
"person " ' 75 qualifies as a financial institution if it "represents that it
will engage in financial contracts as a counterparty on both sides of
one or more financial markets ...
37 This requirement is easily
met because there is no requirement that the "person" actually
participate on both sides of one or more financial markets. 3 77 A
counterparty may rely on a mere representation of participation from
such a "person." The supplementary information that accompanies
the new rule suggests that this creates a "safe harbor" for
counterparties who rely on representations of a "person" that "holds
378
itself out as a market intermediary."

In addition to meeting the broad qualitative test, a "person" must
also meet one requirement of a two-pronged quantitative test before
it may be deemed a "financial institution." The first minimum
threshold test of § 231.3(a) (1) requires a "person" to have outstanding financial contracts of at least $1 billion in notional principal with
counterparties that are not affiliates on any day in the past 15-month
period. 79 In the alternative, a "person" can qualify as a "financial
institution" by having financial contracts on any day in the past 15month period with gross mark-to-market 8 ° value of at least $100
million.38 t
Once a "person" satisfies both the qualitative and quantitative
prongs of the test, it will be considered a "financial institution" for the

text (presenting example of practical application of netting).
374. 58 Fed. Reg. 29,149, 29,152 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 231.3) (proposed
May 19, 1993).
375. See 59 Fed. Reg. 4784 (1994) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231.2(0) ("Person means
any legal entity, foreign or domestic, including a corporation, unincorporated company,
partnership, government unit or instrumentality, trust, natural person, or any other entity or
organization.") By explicitly including "foreign" entities, the Board has ensured that foreign
banks and other significant international participants could qualify as "financial institutions"
under the rule. This will aid in the reduction of systemic risk by reducing the likelihood that
U.S. end-users, dealing with foreign counterparties, could have contracts cherry-picked by a
trustee or conservator of the foreign entity.
376. 59 Fed. Reg. 4785 (1994) (to be codified at 12 G.F.RI § 231.3(a)).
377. The supplemental commentary that accompanies the new rule suggests it would be
difficult for counterparties to ascertain that an institution participates "actively" on both sides
of the markets. 59 Fed. Reg. 4781, 4784. Thus, the Board enacted a flexible standard to
provide a "safe harbor," regardless of whether actual participation did in fact occur.
378. 59 Fed. Reg. 4781, 4784.
379. 59 Fed. Reg. 4781, 4784 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231.3(a)(1)).
380. See GASTINEAU, supra note 7, at 147 (defining mark-to-market as determination of value
of position or portfolio at current market prices).
381. 59 Fed. Reg. 4784, 4785 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231.3(a) (2)).
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purposes of any netting contract it enters into during its period of
qualification, even if the "person subsequently loses its qualification."8 2 This provision affords certainty to counterparties that
contracts entered into with "financial institutions" will be subject to
the netting protections of FDICIA regardless of their counterparty's
future status. To add further protection to netting contracts involving
"financial institutions," a grandfather clause dictates that any "person"
qualifying as a "financial institution" on March 7, 1994 will be
considered a "financial institution" for purposes of any contract
entered into prior to that date. 3
The impact of the new rule is to ensure that a wide group of OTC
derivatives end-users and dealers are protected from the possibility
that their counterparty may engage in the capricious practice of
cherry-picking.
The rule encourages enforceability of netting
contracts, which, as stated above, reduce the level of systemic risk
presented by OTC derivatives. The United States bankruptcy regime,
as it applies to the recognition of netting, now sets a standard for
other countries to emulate.
IV. REDUCING SYSTEMIC RISKS
A.

The Risks of Draconian Oversight

Derivatives present a conundrum. They afford risk management
methods of unprecedented utility, yet set the stage for a possible
breakdown in an individual firm or the economy at large. To reduce
the noxious risks without compromising the rewards, this Comment
advocates that the derivatives industry quickly fill the perceived
"regulatory void"38 4 regarding systemic risk, before the "urge to
regulate,"8 5 and legislate, becomes too overpowering for Congress
386
to resist.

382. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231.3(b)).
383. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 231.3(c)).
384. See Merton H. Miller, in AFtER THE CRASH, LINKAGES BETWEEN STOCKS & FUTURES 17,
21 (RobertJ. Mackay ed., 1988) [hereinafter AFrER THE CRASH] (discussing efforts to forestall
"'fill[ing] the regulatory void'").
385. See Richard C. Breeden, Directors, Control Your Derivatives,WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at
A14 ("[T]he public-policy debate too often sounds like a case of regulation in search of a
problem rather than the other way around"); Leo Melamed, In Defense of Derivatives, BARRON'S,
Mar. 7, 1994, at 67, 67 (comparing Congress' inability to regulate genetic engineering to their
inability to regulate financial engineering); George Melloan, Whitewater, Derivativesand the Urge
to Regulate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1994, at A15 (arguing that Congress' efforts to protect public
from derivatives will be no more effective than their efforts to protect public from S&L crisis).
386. See SPERANDEO, supra note 206, at 109 ("The markets concede that the government
holds the club that can break the back of American business.").
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There are two reasons for advocating a private rather than public
sector solution to systemic risk: (1) the incentive to retain a
prudential degree of risk exists in the private sector but not in the
public sector;38 7 and, (2) regulation that is more onerous in one
jurisdiction relative to another will cause the derivatives business to
flow out of the onerously regulated jurisdiction and into the jurisdiction of least regulatory resistance.388
1.

Private sector incentive

As described above, derivatives have caused several market
participants enormous losses.389 The stakes are high in the OTC
derivatives markets. As these losses show, there is a market discipline
that rewards prudential risk management 9° and punishes excessive
risk-taking. 9 ' Put simply, directors of corporations that wish to
reputation,
avoid vast losses, and thus maintain their employment and3 92
have an incentive to act prudently regarding risk-taking
Critics of this view might suggest that the regulatory discipline
imposed on elected officials to avert risks is more potent than the
market discipline imposed on risk managers. Under this view,
corporate directors can take risks that destroy their firm's capital
without being personally accountable, while regulators absorb the
blame for taxpayer-funded bailouts. Three problems emerge from
this view. First, as evidenced by the savings and loan collapse, intense

387. See AFrER THE CRASH, supra note 384, at 20 ("[T]aking these business decisions away
[regarding the setting of futures margins] from the private sector, where the incentives are right,
and transferring them to the public sector, where the incentives are wrong, will ultimately kill
the futures industry.").
388. See WINCH, CRS REPORT, supranote 140, at 25 (articulating "fear that the [derivatives]
business will simply pick up and move elsewhere" as constraint on regulation); Gramm, supra
note 39, at A12 ("The danger of over-regulation is that overseas competition is just a phone call
away.").
389. See supranotes 110-33 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (describing record earnings for derivatives
dealers).
391. See, e.g., Determined Loser, supra note 122, at 82 (stating that head of Kashima Oil
announced his resignation "to take responsibility" for enormous derivatives losses);
Metallgesllschaft to File Countersuit Over Trading Losses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1994, at A10
(reporting that chairman, most of board of directors, finance director, and president of U.S.
subsidiary were all fired following trading loss).
392. See Breeden, supra note 385, at A14 (explaining corporate directors incentive to
prudentially manage derivatives risks). Anecdotally, the ill-fated chief executive officer of
Metallgesellschaft, Heinz Schimmelbusch, presents an example of negative incentives on a
personal level. Following Metallgesellschaft's spectacular losses under Herr Schimellbusch's
stewardship, the CEO lost his job, and has received death threats because of the significant
layoffs accompanying MG's bankruptcy bailout. William Glasgall & Karen Lowry Miller, Executive
in Exile, BuS. WK., Mar. 21, 1994, at 52, 52.
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393
regulatory supervision does not always lead to a reduction of risk.
Second, as Nobel laureate Merton Miller has said, "[r] egulators never
lose by setting margins high."394 That is, regulators protect themselves from public disapproval by embracing overly risk-averse policies,
notwithstanding the fact that in the process, the possibility for a
substantial net gain to society may be foregone. 395 Third, as a
Congressman who has proposed legislation of the derivatives markets
admits, "the problems [derivatives] present may be too sophisticated
for a Congress of generalists to deal with legislatively.""9 6 Indeed,
the vast disparity in pay between derivatives traders and bureaucrats
suggests that the private sector maintains a comparative advantage
97
over the public sector in terms of quantitative sophistication.
Thus, the byzantine risks of derivatives are best managed by those
engaged in the competition of the marketplace, who have the
expertise and incentive to manage risks wisely.

2.

Meintainingbusiness within U.S. borders

Government regulation imposes substantial costs and impediments
on users of regulated products.3 9 8 Government regulation that
imposes high costs on the OTC derivatives markets will create an
incentive for end-users to transact their OTC business offshore.

393. Indeed, too much federal supervision may increase risks. See Melloan, supra note 385,
at A15 (suggesting that federal safety net for S&L's became "so cushy" because of virtually
unlimited federal deposit insurance coverage, leading to imprudent behavior).
394. See AFTER THE CRASH, supra note 384, at 20 (discussing why futures margins should not
be set by regulators).
395. Cf Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Nov. 29, 1802), in POLITICAL
QUOTATIONS 92 (Daniel B. Baker ed., 1990) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: "If we can prevent the
government from wasting the labors of the people under the pretense of taking care of them,
they must become happy."
396. SeeJames A. Leach, Leach Calls for Strengthened Regulation of Financial Derivatives
Industry 1 (Nov. 22, 1993) (press release on file with The American University Law Review) (noting
that complexity does not rule out legislation of derivatives industry). But cf Hu, Misunderstood
Derivatives,supranote 2, at 1502 ("Government, rather than the private sector, has the incentive
and ability to become informed about systemic risks.").
397. See Brett D. Fromson, Wall Street's Risky Bets, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1993, at Al, A28
(estimating one derivative trader's annual salary at $2-3 million per year and asserting that
$500,000 to $1 million per year is "not unusual"); Hansell & Muehring, supra note 53, at 62
(quoting SEC director of market regulation William Heyman: "For $112,000 a year [the top
U.S. federal bureaucrat's salary], we can't hire someone who can check the models of kids
making ten times that... ."); Loomis, supra note 49, at 57 (explaining that "bank supervisors
are struggling to teach $80,000 bank examiners how to supervise a world in which a top-notch
derivatives trader can make $1 million a year easily and maybe much more than that"); Carol
J. Loomis, A IWhle New Way to Run a Bank FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1992, at 78 (describing derivatives
trader who quit Bankers Trust because combined annual salary and bonus of $3 million was
"insufficient").
398. Gramm, supra note 39, at A12.
399. See AFrER THE CRASH, supra note 384, at 21. Professor Miller points out:
It is important to keep in mind that we are no longer king of the hill in world capital
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The impact of this overseas business migration would be two-fold.
First, the profitability of U.S. dealers that issue OTC derivative
instruments would decline. Second, the flow of transactions to
offshore dealers would have the ironic effect of decreasing the
regulatory oversight of the OTC derivatives markets by U.S. regulators.

40 0

The flow of capital out of the United States and into the Eurobond
market is one example of a financial migration that occurred in
reaction to government-created costs. In the late 1960s, the United
States instituted a thirty percent withholding tax on interest paid on
bonds sold in the United States to foreign investors. °1 To avoid
this onerous tax, the central market for dollar-denominated bonds for
non-U.S. citizens moved from New York to London. 40 2 Despite the
repeal of the withholding tax, the market has remained
subsequent
03
overseas.

4

B. Recommendations
1.

Internationalnetting recognition

The evolution of the United States bankruptcy regime has resulted
in a high degree of certainty that contractual provisions, such as closeout netting, will be enforceable in accordance with agreed terms
under U.S. law. The Board's new rule regarding the definition of
"financial institution," a response to the lingering inadequacies of the
American regime, is a significant step towards reducing systemic risk
and perpetuating a safe and efficient marketplace.
Yet as the Bank of International Settlements has stated, "netting
schemes only reduce credit and liquidity exposures if they have a
sound legal basis [in all jurisdictions]."4°4 Modem financial transac-

markets. The foreign share of the financial services and futures industry has already
grown substantially in recent years and will continue to grow. We cannot stop that, but
we can certainly accelerate it with ill-conceived regulation.
Id.; see also Levitt, PSA Speech, supra note 72, at 1 ("I am keenly mindful of the cost, impact and
time commitments occasioned by regulation. Wherever possible, the Commission will lay out
our case, seek the broadest kind of public response, and, dealing with the parties involved, call
for private sector responses.").
400. See Gramm, supra note 39, at A12 (describing irony of decreased ability to regulate
business that goes offshore because of high regulatory costs).
401. See MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 167, at 7 (describing genesis of
Eurobond market).
402.
403.

MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 167, at 7.
MILLER, FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 167, at 7.

It should be noted that one

reason the Eurobond market continued to flourish overseas was the circumvention of further
regulation: a costly SEC prospectus requirement. Id.
404. See BIS NETTING SCHEMES REPORT, supra note 373, at 16 (discussing legal enforceability
of netting's importance).
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lions are increasingly global in nature. The fear that netting agreements 5 will not be upheld by foreign courts, heightening the risk
of a systemic-disturbance, is a "serious concern" to forty-three percent
of senior management at OTC derivatives dealers, and "some
concern" to another forty-five percent.406 The enforceability of
netting arrangements is questionable in several 4international
08
jurisdictions, 4 °7 despite legal assurances to the contrary.
Frederick R. Medero, the Executive Director of ISDA, has
asserted that foreign jurisdictions need to "take a snapshot of the
United States [bankruptcy regulation] paradigm, and do the same
That is, foreign
thing [with their own regulatory regime].""
jurisdictions should study the U.S. bankruptcy regime, and conform
their bankruptcy laws to its explicit recognition of the ISDA Master
Agreement. This Comment advocates this approach as the best
method to reduce the credit risk component of systemic risk. '
Derivatives are primarily used by participants who wish to reduce
risk. By increasing certainty regarding counterparty bankruptcy risk,
the risk-averse will increase participation in the OTC derivatives
markets. This, in turn, will result in deeper, more liquid, and

405. See supra notes 240-53 and accompanying text (describing netting and capricious
practice of cherry-picking).
406. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 17 (discussing netting enforceability
concerns of respondents to survey).
407. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supranote 4, app. II at 11 (describing "uncertainty" and
"difficulty concern[ing] the right of termination ...and the efficacy of the close out netting
provisions"). While the French enforceability survey concluded that netting arrangements are
likely to be enforceable in accordance with their terms, it acknowledged "uncertainty... in the
absence of specific statutory or judicial authority." Id. at 15; see also BANK OF ENGLAND,
DERIVATIVES, supra note 181, 1 53 (reporting "widespread" concern of derivatives firms to have
non-US netting enforceability "clarified"); CFTC REPORT, supra note 50, at 110 (calling legality
of close-out netting "in doubt" in some foreign jurisdictions); WINCH, CRS REPORT, supra note
140, at 19 n.42 (stating "[n]etting of swap contracts has been affirmed by bankruptcy legislation
in the United States . . . but the situation in other countries is less clear."); DEUTSCHE
BUNDESBANK, supranote 52, at53 (describing legal enforceability ofclose-out netting agreements
as "unclear as far as German or international insolvency law is concerned"); Behof, supra note
308, at 28-29 (articulating opinion that enforceability of netting is not as "straightforward" in
foreign jurisdictions as in United States). Does this legal uncertainty increase the pricing of
derivative instruments? This question has not yet been answered by economists. See Wendy L.
Gramm & Gerald D. Gay, Scams, Scoundrels and Scapegoats: A Taxonomy of CEA Regulation Over
DerivativeInstrumentsJ.DERIVATV.S (forthcoming 1994) (urging economists tojoin debate over
correct regulatory landscape).
408. The ISDA has solicited enforceability opinions from local law firms in Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Behof, supra
note 308, at 25-26. These opinions all conclude that close-out netting and set-off is "likely" to
be enforceable. The dearth ofjudicial precedent that informs these opinions is likely to give
little comfort to derivatives participants. See id. at 26 (asserting few derivatives firms have gone
bankrupt). Complicating matters further, different legal regimes often have conflicting
bankruptcy laws, making a harmonized international agreement potentially unworkable. Id.
409. Interview with Frederick R. Medero, Executive Director, ISDA, in New York, N.Y. (July
28, 1993).
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ultimately more efficient markets.
2.

Risk management

As stated above, the discipline of the market provides incentives for
senior management to engage in prudential management of
derivatives portfolios."'
In light of the substantial losses that
resulted from improper oversight by boards of directors,4" however,
it is clear that market discipline alone is insufficient to conform
managerial behavior to a desired level of prudence. This is so
because of two fundamental corporate governance failings regarding
derivatives: (1) lack of independent risk managers; and, (2) lack of
corporate directors with quantitative backgrounds.4
a.

Independence

"Independence" of risk managers means evaluation of risks will be
undertaken by individuals whose compensation is not linked to
trading profits. In Recommendation 12, the Group of Thirty suggests
that "[d]ealers and end-users should have a credit risk management
function with clear independence .. ,,.""
Yet the study goes on to
note that " [t] he risk management function is rarely involved in actual
'
risk taking decisions."414
If risk managers maintain any involvement
in risk taking, how can they be independent?
The Group of Thirty's standard of independence is too flexible to
ensure risk managers do not have risk taking incentives to behave
imprudently. This Comment supports the adoption of a more
stringent standard for independence. Under this standard, dealers
and end-users should voluntarily adopt a bright line test for "indepen-

410. See Loomis, A Whole New Way to Run a Bank, supranote 397, at 77 (quoting CEO of large
derivatives dealer. "the single most important measure of a CEO is his company's stock price.");
supranotes 389-97 and accompanying text (describing market discipline to engage in prudential
management). Given that record trading profits have not helped stock prices of derivatives
dealers, supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text, this quote suggests the market discipline is
felt by chief executive officers.
411. See supranotes 110-26 and accompanying text (describing large losses from improper
Board oversight).
412. See e.g., Salomon HiresKlotz to Fill
New Position in DerivativesArea, WALL ST.J., Feb. 2, 1994,
at B6 (describing Salomon Brothers' employment of derivatives researcher with "potent statistical
and theoretical background... including extensive academic training in mathematics"); supra
note 25 (describing predominance of advanced science and mathematics degrees in ranks of
Wall Street derivatives traders).
Because of the increasing complexity of derivatives,
"mathematical expertise will become more highly prized." Id. This Comment simply advocates
that mathematical expertise should also "become more highly prized," id., at the corporate
director level.
413. GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 15. See also Beese, supra note 32, at 32
(calling for managers that are "separate from the traders incurring the risk").
414. GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
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dence," where risk managers have no involvement in risk taking.
The rationale for independent supervision is clear. Bonuses based
on profitable trading performance can be extraordinarily high.4 1
Thus, for risk managers with compensation linked to trading
profitability, incentives of personal profit may outweigh the market
incentives to ensure prudent risk exposure. As a result, risk managers
who have compensation linked to risk- taking may "emphasize rewards
and downplay risks."416
A fraud committed at ABN-AMRO, a bank that is both an end-user
and dealer of OTC derivatives, exemplifies the negative incentives for
risk managers who have revenue-based compensation. 417 ABNAMRO's chief foreign exchange options trader and an assistant, two
employees with revenue-based compensation, conspired to falsely
418
inflate figures that made huge trading losses appear as profits.
The case highlights the imprudence of allowing risk management
policy to be set by trading desks without independent oversight. Even
where risk strategies are determined independently, the ABN-AMRO
case illustrates why independent auditors must not rely exclusively on
pricing assumptions provided by employees with revenue-based
compensation.
Moreover, the trading fraud at ABN-AMRO is not an isolated
incident. The head government bond trader at Kidder Peabody &

415. See supra note 397 (describing multi-million dollar trading bonuses that are common
feature of derivatives industry).
416. See Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supra note 2, at 1492 (stating that "agents often have
incentives to take action contrary to their principal's best interests... A person engaged in
derivatives operations may emphasize rewards and downplay risks."). Regarding incentives,
Professor Hu also notes that traders who incur vast losses trading may lose nothing more than
their jobs and reputation, while "a successful gamble could mean lifetime wealth." Id. at 1493.
In fact, the downside risk to employment and reputation may be overstated. Although Howard
Rubin, the trader credited with losing $377 million on one unhedged position in 1987, did
indeed lose his job with Merrill Lynch, supra note 110 and accompanying text, he remained
unemployed for less than seven months. See Stephen Taub et al., The $650 Million Man, FIN.
WORLD, July 6, 1993, at 38, 38 (reporting that Rubin was hired to trade for investment bank
Bear, Steams and Co.). In a happy ending to the story, Rubin was paid $7 million in 1992 and
is head of Bear Steams' collateralized mortgage obligations desk. Id. It is possible that the
willingness to take on big risks, even destructive ones, may counter-intuitively enhance reputation in the industry. But see Terence Roth, Ex-Metallgesellschaft Chief Vows a Fight Amid Growing
Fallout from Debacle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at A10 (discussing CEO who presided over
enormous trading losses as "unemployable" and social pariah).
417. See Breeden, supra note 385, at A14 (blaming ABN-AMRO fraud on lack of independent
individuals validating trading desk's pricing assumptions).
418. See Industry StandardSoughtfor Valuing Options,EUROMONEY, May 1993, at 48, 48 ("One
obvious lesson of the affair is not to rely on the options traders to provide variables such as
volatility rates . .. ."). This was accomplished by falsifying options tickets to reflect higher

income from premiums and overvaluing options positions by roughly $70 million. Id.
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Co. inserted fictitious trades into the computer.41 The trader was
given revenue-based compensation of $9 million for 1993,42 o after
his phantom trades showed profits of $350 million. 42 ' The trader

42
was able to avoid detection by manipulating the computer system.

The same month that Kidder discovered this fraud, two other traders
were fired for unrelated reasons. In the first, a trader was dismissed
for concealing losses by manipulating the valuations of a swap.423
In the second, a bond-derivatives vice president was dismissed after it
was discovered that he was simultaneously working for a rival trading
company.424 Viewing these trading frauds in conjunction with the
one committed at ABN-AMRO, it would appear that derivatives
dealers and significant end-users cannot afford the absence of
independent risk management.
One criticism of this independent risk management proposal would
4
be the difficulty of locating competent personnel for the job. 1

Clearly, a high degree of intellectual firepower is required to
comprehend the risk complexity.426 The incredible revenue-based
compensation for trading-related activity has led to a steady migration
of academics to Wall Street trading floors; 4 7 to lure "rocket scientists" to independent risk management departments would require
extraordinarily high compensation.

419. See Fromson, supra note 118, at H4 (explaining that trader pretended to purchase
"strips" where interest and principal of bond are split into two discrete products).
420. Fromson, supra note 118, at H4.
421. Fromson, supranote 118, at H4.
422. Fromson, supranote 118, at H4 (reporting that trader avoided detection until recently
by continuously leaving fake trades open on computer). Had the trades closed, the computer
would have detected the falsification.
423. Fromson, supra note 118, at H4.
424. See Michael Siconolfi, KidderPeabodyFiredBond Aide on Ties to Riva4 WALL ST.J., Apr. 21,
1994, atA3 (describing derivatives trading executive dismissal because of work for rival). While
an independent risk manager would be unlikely to uncover this particular fraud, it is illustrative
of the fact, stated previously, that incentives of personal profit may outweigh market incentives
to behave prudently and ethically. See supra note 416 and accompanying text (stating that agents
often have incentives to behave in manner opposite to their principal's best interests).
425. See Mullins, supranote 40, at 8 (questioning how risk managers that do not share in
benefits of risk taking can "be compensated adequately to avoid migration of the best personnel
to risk-taking functions"). The difficulty in obtaining top quality personnel is analogous to the
one faced by regulators attempting to understand derivatives' risks. See supra note 397
(describing gross disparity between trader compensation and governmental compensation).
426. See Salomon Hires Klotz to Fill New Position in Derivatives Area, supra note 412, at B6
(describing importance of mathematical expertise in understanding "increasingly arcane" risks
presented by derivatives).
427. SeeJeffrey M. Laderman, FisherBlack is PracticingWhat He Teaches, BUS. WIK, Aug. 6,
1984, at 75, 75 (describing how Wall Street investment bank Goldman Sachs lured noted
academic Fischer Black away from academia to trading department); Louis Uchitelle, A Bidding
WarForProfessors Who Know Wall Street Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1989, at Al (reporting that Wall
Street recruits finance professors to carry out complex trading strategies and noting that base
pay is low but "bonuses and profit sharing can swell this compensation substantially").
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The solution is to offer independent risk managers a salary
comparable to individuals who are compensated with revenue-based
bonuses and profit-sharing. 28 Wall Street firms may incorrectly view
this increased compensation as unnecessary cost. The alternative is
a knowledge gap between rocket scientist traders and relatively
unsophisticated independent risk managers. This could lead to
exploitation of insufficient management knowledge by traders, as seen
4
in both the ABN-AMRO and Kidder Peabody cases. 2

Consequent-

ly, large losses could accrue, increasing Congress' desire to legislate
solutions to systemic risk. In a cost/benefit analysis, highly compensated independent risk managers are significantly less expensive than
market losses and congressional legislation.4"'
b.

Quantitative backgrounds

The Bank for International Settlements has suggested that due to

the complexity of risks presented by the derivatives markets, firms that
wish to maintain profits without sacrificing prudence must employ
It is axiomatic that these "highly
"highly skilled individuals."43"
only on the trading floor and risk
not
exist
must
skilled individuals"
management department, but also at the top levels of firm management.43 2 Yet senior management and boards of directors often lack

the requisite quantitative skills necessary to understand the risks

428. See OCC Banking Circular 277, supra note 77, at 18-19 (recommending that senior
management "recognize the need for, and devote appropriate resources to, employing
knowledgeable and experienced personnel in the operations area"). The Banking Circular
suggests implementing this policy with "appropriate hiring practices and compensation plans."
Id. at 19.
429. See also Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1457 (citing BIS RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS REPORT, supranote 214, at 18 ("Management ignorance could be exploited by
traders wishing to hide latent losses in positions they carried.")).
430. See, e.g., supra notes 385-94 and accompanying text (describing loss of US Eurobond
business to London following onerous regulation); supra notes 240-53 (relating losses that have
occurred because of inadequate risk management systems). An analogous situation is the
increase in compensation of compliance personnel at securities firms. To attract top quality
employees, salaries for Wall Street compliance personnel increased roughly 40% between 1989
and 1993. See Cheryl Beth Strauss, Out of the Shadows, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Feb. 1, 1993
(asserting that "[s]alaries come cheaper than settlement fees.").
431. BIS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REPORT, supra note 214, at 2 (stating that "the complexity
of risks incurred in OTC derivatives markets means that firms that want to participate profitably
and safely in them must have at their disposal ... highly skilled individuals").
432. The philosophy of Ayn Rand teaches that hiring one's intellectual superior and allowing
that individual free reign without oversight leads ultimately to destruction. See AYN RAND, ATLAS
SHRUGGED 388 (1957) ("The man who attempts to purchase the brains of his superiors to serve
him, with his money replacing his judgment, ends up by becoming the victim of his inferiors.")
This admonition is relevant to hiring rocket scientists, paying for their brains, and turning them
loose in one's organization with the hope that they know what they are doing.
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employees are incurring.4"' This failing of corporate
governance
45
43 4
has led to "lax oversight," and significant losses.
To rectify the lack of quantitative skills on boards of directors, this
Comment advocates that dealers and significant end-users of the OTC
derivatives markets maintain at least three members on the board of
directors with significant quantitative skills. This number is arbitrarily
chosen, intended to provide a variety of quantitative perspectives
without unduly altering the composition of the board. The degree
of quantitative skills required by the term "significant" is flexible, but
should correspond to the level of complexity inherent to the
institution's activity in the OTC derivatives markets.
The voluntary enactment of this flexible standard by dealers and
significant end-users will significantly reduce the likelihood that
corporate governance failures, as described above, will recur. This, in
turn, will lessen the impetus for procrustean legislation.
3.

Disclosure

There are few requirements of public disclosure for users and
dealers of derivative instruments. For example, neither the credit risk
nor the market risk of derivatives positions designated as "hedges"
must appear in the main text of most financial institutions's financial
statements. 43 6 Instead, the Financial Accounting Standards Board's
(FASB) Statement No. 105 merely requires that disclosure of financial
instruments with off-balance sheet437credit risk be disclosed in a
footnote of the financial statement.
As a result of limited disclosure requirements, it is difficult for
regulators, investors, and participants themselves to obtain meaning-

433. See Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives,supranote 2, at 1493 (explaining that "[m]any senior
bank managers do not have a quantitative background").
434. SeeSchares, supranote 126, at 48 (noting that "[M]etallgesellschaft's collapse highlights
a devastating weakness in ... corporate governance.").
435. See Loomis, supranote 49, at 52 (noting CEO of Metallgesellschaft's comment following
trading debacle: "I always informed the supervisory board (of the risks incurred] to the best of
my knowledge . .. ."). Yet the "hedges" Metallgesellschaft were attempting were so poorly
conceived, supranote 126, board members with quantitative backgrounds would arguably have
noticed the hedging mismatch and taken steps to reduce the severity of the disaster.
436. SeeJ. Carter Beese, Jr., Testimony Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, United States House of Representatives, Concerning the Regulation of Derivatives
Activities I 1 (Oct. 28, 1993) ("At the present time, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
*.. do not comprehensively address the manner in which public companies must account for
and disclose their derivative activity.").
437. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION ABOUT
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS wITH OFF-BALANCE-SHEET RISK AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS WITH
CONCENTRATIONS OF CREDIT RISK (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 105) 4

(1990). Beyond a general disclosure discussion, specific concepts regarding accounting for
derivative instruments are outside the scope of this comment.
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ful information regarding the nature and magnitude of OTC
derivative use." The Group of Thirty has responded to this inadequacy by recommending voluntary disclosure of both qualitative and
quantitative information regarding derivatives exposure and policy.439

440
This disclosure would include "sufficient information"

about whether transactions are undertaken for the purpose of
hedging, risk management, or speculation. Additionally, disclosure
would be required regarding which transactions are undertaken, the
size of the transactions, the magnitude of risk involved, and which
accounting methods are used to value the transactions.44'
Banks have been reticent about disclosing their derivatives
activity.442' As a result, regulators have increased disclosure scrutiny,443 and stock prices have tumbled. 4 In a financial crisis, lack of
balance sheet transparency might cause institutions to refuse to
transact business with firms rumored to be experiencing financial
difficulty. 5 By implementing the disclosure recommendation of
the Group of Thirty, banks may see their stock prices improve to
reflect record trading revenues.4 46

438. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (reporting inadequate disclosure of
counterparty credit risk to be of concern to "about three-fifths of dealers" who responded to
survey); Lipin, supranote 86, at B3 (noting investor discomfort over fact that most banks do not
disclose how much revenue is attributed to brokering customer transactions versus speculative
trading); Breeden, supra note 50, at 9 (discussing difficulty for regulators to distinguish hedging
activity from speculation).
439. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (encouraging adoption of disclosure
recommendations due to public concern).
440.

GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 21.

441. See GROUP OF THIRTY REPORT, supra note 4, at 21 (asserting that "[flinancial statements
of dealers and end-users should contain sufficient information about their use of derivatives to
provide an understanding of the purposes for which transactions are undertaken, the extent of
the transactions, the degree of risk involved, and how the transactions have been accounted
for").
442. See Lipin, supra note 86, at B3 (describing banking industry's secrecy regarding
disclosure of trading revenues).
443. See Becky Gaylord, FASB to Seek MoreDisclosureon Derivatives, WALL ST.J., Mar. 23, 1994,
at C23 (discussing current FASB proposal that would enhance disclosure requirements for
holdings of derivatives instruments); Lynn Stevens Hume, FASB Standards to Seek Improved
Disclosureon Derivatives,BOND BUYER, Mar. 2, 1994, at 1, 1 (noting broker-dealers and other firms
will have to begin disclosing differentiation between derivatives used for trading, risk
management, or hedging).
444. See supranote 88-91 and accompanying text (blaming lack of disclosure for decline in
bank stocks).
445.

See BIS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REPORT, supra note 214, at 34 (explaining how financial

straits at one firm could render it unable to transact business in market crisis because of lack
of risk disclosure); supra note 154-58 (describing how illiquidity of market participant could
disenable it from transacting hedges when most necessary).
446. See Lipin, supra note 86, at B3 (quoting a bank consulting firm executive stating:
"[B]anks who disclose more than the average tend to get the benefit of the doubt on their stock
price."); RobertJ. Schwartz, Adequacy of Regulatory Controls on OTC Market Activity: Transparency,
Reporting and Disclosure,Remarks at Commodity Futures Trading Commission Symposium on
OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation 4 (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with The American
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Many banks have rejected calls for increased disclosure, using a "we
know what we are doing"447 approach. One common banking
argument is that the credit and market risks presented by derivatives
are "no different than the risks that financial intermediaries take in
all their other lines of business."'
Implicit in this argument is the
assertion that banks are good at managing this kind of risk. The
persuasiveness of this argument must be examined in light of the
banking industry's past success in their analogous "other lines of
business." In fact, claims of credit and market expertise are belied by
the industry's loans to lesser developed countries, 9 funding of the
1980s commercial real estate boom, and purchase of highly leveraged
transaction debt.45
This Comment does not suggest that banks are imprudently
managing their derivatives exposures. Because of past market and
credit risk mismanagement, however, it would benefit banks and all
other participants in the OTC derivatives markets to voluntarily
disclose the extent and nature of their participation. This would
reduce investor fears and lead to improved equity valuations for
shareholders, fulfilling one CEO's view that "'the single most
important measure of a CEO is his company's stock price.""'4 5 It
would have the secondary purpose of narrowing the knowledge gap
between regulators and the OTC derivatives industry,452 averting
unnecessary legislation that could push the industry offshore.

University Law Review) ("Institutions that do not efficiently disclose information will find it more
difficult to attract investors and counterparties.").
447. See Hansell & Muehring, supra note 53, at 50 (describing "condescending attitude" of
bankers).
448. See Claudia Cummins, Swaps Industry is Self-Regulating ChairmanSays, AM. BANKER, Oct.
28, 1993, at 3, 3 (quotingJoseph P. Bauman, Citibank's head of business development for global
derivatives and chairman of ISDA). See also Mullins, supra note 40, at 4 (stating that risks are
"no different than the types of risk associated with traditional instruments-loans, securities, and
deposits.").
449. See, e.g., Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Deb4 1989 COLuM. Bus. L. REV.
137, 137 (1989) (noting that "[W]ith keen competition to find profitable projects and the
pressure to earn healthy returns on their deposit bases, many of the major money center banks
imprudently exposed themselves in Latin America and elsewhere, filling their portfolios with
underperforming or defaulting loans.").
450. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fai4 Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of
NationwideBanks, 77 IOwA L. REv. 957, 965 (1992) (noting that attempt by banking industry to
improve profits by "making high-risk loans to less developed countries (LDCs), corporations
involved in highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) and real estate developers" resulted in large
losses).
451. See Loomis, supra note 397, at 77 (quoting Bankers Trust Chairman Charles S. Sanford,
Jr. on importance of stock valuation).
452. See Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 2, at 1495 (suggesting that because
regulators know far less about derivatives than bankers, regulators could "solve the informational
problem by banning derivatives").
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CONCLUSION

The OTC derivatives markets stand upon a precipice, with the
threat of ill-informed legislators on one side and the possibility of a
systemic breakdown on the other. The evolution of the United States
bankruptcy regime has resulted in an affirmative step away from the
ledge. But this positive step is not enough. International imposition
of bankruptcy regimes that explicitly recognize close-out netting,
increased disclosure, independent risk managers, and quantitatively
adept boards of directors are necessary to avert both draconian
legislation and the systemic breakdown it seeks to prevent.
As PresidentJohn E Kennedy once remarked, "the time to fix the
roof is while the sun is shining."45 The sun has generally shone on
the OTC derivatives industry. Now is the time for the industry to take
steps to avert the impending deluge. The alternative is to remain on
the precipice and await the storm.

453.

GREAT QuOTES FROM GREAT LEADERS 85 (Peggy Anderson ed., 1990).

